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I.

INTRODUCTION

Depriving a widespread group of hopeful future immigrants
the opportunity to reside lawfully in the United States can destroy
1
“the hopes and aspirations of a lifetime.” It can operate not only
1. See Mayo v. Ashcroft, 317 F.3d 867, 874 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing In re S—
and B—C—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 436, 446 (B.I.A. 1961) (quoting Report of the
President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization 177 (Jan. 1, 1953)).
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against the individual immediately but also bear heavily upon his or
2
her family both in and outside of the United States. Recently, in
3
Orozco v. Mukasey, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
issued a decision that closes off an important path to lawful
4
5
permanent residency for numerous non-citizens. Although the
6
court’s decision was vacated on October 20, 2008, the decision laid
the groundwork for the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or
7
the “Board”) now to issue a precedential decision having the same,
if not even greater, impact on non-citizens seeking to gain legal
8
status in the United States. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit set
forth a detailed analysis for the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
9
Services (“CIS”) and circuit courts nationwide to follow, which will
Although the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the authors generally favor
the “Matter of” citation format for decisions by the BIA, the authors use the “In re”
format in this case note in order to conform to current Bluebook citation
standards. See BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.6, at 62
(2004)
[hereinafter
BIA
PRACTICE
MANUAL],
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/pracmanual/chap4.pdf
(stating
that “[a]ll precedent decisions should be cited as ‘Matter of.’ The use of “In re” is
not favored”); THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 10.2.1(b), at 82
(Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).
2. Id.
3. 521 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2008).
4. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(20) (2006) (stating that a lawful permanent resident is a non-citizen
who has been “lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the
United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws . . . .”).
5. The immigration statute, the Immigration and Nationality Act
[hereinafter “INA” or the “Act”], “contains definitions of a number of terms by
which it classifies persons subject to its jurisdiction.” AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. &
STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:5.1
(4th ed. 2008). The main group of individuals covered by the Act is referred to as
“aliens,” defined as “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” INA
§ 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). For purposes of this case note, however, we
will use the term “non-citizen” instead of “alien.”
6. Orozco v. Mukasey, --- F.3d ----, 2008 WL 4615000 (9th Cir. Oct 20, 2008).
See infra Part V.A. for a discussion of the procedural history and current posture of
the case.
7. The Board of Immigration Appeals is the highest administrative tribunal
on immigration and nationality matters in the United States. BIA PRACTICE
MANUAL, § 1.2(a), at 1 (2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/
pracmanual/chap1.pdf. The BIA is a component of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, which is a component of the Department of Justice and
operates under the authority and supervision of the Attorney General. Id. §
1.2(b) at 2.
8. BIA PRACTICE MANUAL, Ch. 1.4(d)(i) (last rev. July 30, 2004) (stating that
“[p]ublished decisions also constitute precedent that binds the Board, the
Immigration Courts, and DHS”).
9. CIS is a government agency within the U.S. Department of Homeland
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similarly limit the ability of non-citizens to adjust their status to
lawful permanent residents and likely result in substantial
hardships on both individuals and their families.
Historically, non-citizens who were residing in the United
States were required to leave the country before they could obtain
10
lawful permanent resident status in the United States.
That
changed, however, when Congress enacted section 245 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed non-citizens to
remain in the United States as they adjusted status to that of lawful
11
Today,
permanent residents if certain conditions were met.
section 245(a) sets forth the criteria for adjusting one’s status in the
12
United States.
One requirement is that the non-citizen be
13
In 1996,
inspected and “admitted” into the United States.
Congress added a definition of the term “admitted,” which requires
14
a “lawful entry” into the United States.
The issue in Orozco essentially boiled down to the court’s
15
interpretation of this seemingly simple term: “admitted.” There,
the petitioner, Brian Orozco (“Orozco”), who had no legal means
by which to enter the country, appeared for inspection at a port-ofentry and presented someone else’s permanent resident card
16
(“green card”) to an immigration officer. Upon inspection, the
17
officer allowed Orozco to enter the United States. Orozco argued
that despite his use of a false document, he was nevertheless
Security that is responsible for adjudicating immigration benefits, such as
immigrant visa petitions, naturalization petitions, and asylum and refugee
applications. RICHARD A. BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 2 (2006); CIS
website, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac892
43c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2af29c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&v
gnextchannel=2af29c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD.
10. Charles C. Foster, The Logic of Adjustment of Status to Permanent Residency, 24
S. TEX. L.J. 37, 37 (1983).
11. Id. at 38.
12. INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
13. Id. The statute provides for certain exceptions of individuals who entered
the United States without inspection to nevertheless adjust their status. See, e.g.,
INA § 245(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). Such exceptions are beyond the scope of this
case note.
14. Id. § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (stating that “[t]he terms
‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the
alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration
officer”); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 301, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-586 (1997).
15. Orozco v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008).
16. Id. at 1069–70.
17. See id. at 1070.
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“admitted” because he was inspected by an immigration officer at a
18
port-of-entry and authorized to proceed. Thus, Orozco argued,
he was eligible to adjust his status under section 245(a) with the
19
appropriate waiver for his use of the false document. The Ninth
20
Circuit disagreed. According to the court, the statutory language
of section 245(a) and the “admission” definition is clear: a noncitizen who enters the country by fraudulent means cannot satisfy
the “lawful entry” requirement of the “admission” definition and,
21
thus, is statutorily ineligible to adjust status under section 245(a).
The court based its conclusion on the perceived unambiguous
language of the statute and found support for its conclusion in an
agency regulation, an earlier Ninth Circuit decision, and the
“absurd results” that it said would follow if it adopted Orozco’s
22
argument. The Ninth Circuit then dismissed Orozco’s appeal and
upheld the decisions of the BIA and Immigration Judge ordering
23
his removal from the United States to Mexico.
The court’s analysis in Orozco forecloses the opportunity to
apply for adjustment of status to countless numbers of individuals
who would otherwise have been eligible to apply for adjustment of
status in conjunction with a waiver of inadmissibility for their fraud
or misrepresentation. It also forces individuals to seek waivers (if
eligible) under certain grounds in the INA that were previously
unnecessary. Although the decision was limited to the Ninth
24
Circuit and has now been vacated, there is substantial concern
25
that the BIA will now issue a published decision in line with the
Ninth Circuit or that other circuit courts will follow suit.
This case note asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
the term “admitted” was incorrect and inconsistent with existing

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1069, 1073.
22. Id. at 1071–72. The court also rejected Orozco’s argument that the Board
of Immigration Appeals and Immigration Judge erred in declining to follow the
published agency decision, In re Areguillin, which interpreted the term “admission”
within the context of section 245(a) of the Act. Id. at 1072–73.
23. Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1073.
24. The Ninth Circuit covers the following territories: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Nevada, Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon,
Montana, and Washington. See U.S. Courts: The Federal Judiciary,
http://www.uscourts.gov/courtlinks (last visited Dec. 13, 2008).
25. The Board’s decision in Orozco was not published. Orozco, 521 F.3d at
1070.
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BIA precedent and that someone who entered the United States
under Orozco’s circumstances has indeed accomplished an
“admission” within the meaning of section 245(a).
Part II provides basic background information about relevant
immigration terms and concepts, including the immigration
statute, the definition and parameters of adjustment of status
under section 245(a), the term “admission,” and the waivers
available under the Act for fraud or certain misrepresentations.
Part III discusses the facts of the Orozco decision along with the
court’s analysis of Orozco’s statutory eligibility for adjustment of
status.
Part IV examines and dissects the court’s decision, beginning
with its statutory construction of the term “admitted” and how the
meaning of that term is not as clear as the court asserts. Through
examples of BIA and circuit court decisions, the case note
highlights the different meanings that courts have occasionally
assigned the term “admission” despite the seemingly clear language
26
in the statute.
The case note then looks at the primary and
longstanding BIA precedent decision analyzing the term
“admission” in the context of adjustment of status and discusses
whether it remains good law despite Congress’ creation of the
27
Because the Ninth Circuit in
“admission” definition in 1996.
Orozco concluded that the 1996 statutory change did essentially
overrule the BIA decision, this note asserts that the court should
have at least remanded the case to the agency for a better
explanation of its departure from existing precedent before
rendering a decision on the case. The final sections of Part IV
point to the practical and seemingly unintended effects of the
Orozco analysis on other provisions in the INA. Part IV also speaks
to the court’s concern over “absurd results” if it adopted Orozco’s
28
argument, asserting that such concern is misplaced because
numerous statutory provisions are already in place to penalize the
fraudulent activity underlying Orozco’s entry into the United
States.
Finally, Part V discusses the impact of the Orozco decision on
the courts, the agency, and on immigrants. This note concludes
that the Board, when reconsidering Orozco’s case, should follow its
long-standing precedent in finding that a non-citizen who was
26.
27.
28.

INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006).
Id. § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).
Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1072.
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inspected at a port-of-entry and allowed to enter the United States
has been “admitted” for the purposes of INA sections 101(a)(13)
and 245(a).
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT
A. A Brief Overview of the Immigration and Nationality Act
“In its earliest days, the United States did not restrict
29
The first immigration laws unfolded
immigration in any way.”
30
during the so-called “open door” period from 1776 to 1875, when
31
32
In the midCongress passed the Naturalization Act of 1790.
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Congress passed other
federal laws with the aim of controlling the admission of
33
immigrants “in a more systematic way.” At the beginning of the
34
twentieth century, immigration policy turned to quotas. Yet, it
29. Elwin Griffith, Reforming the Immigration and Nationality Act: Labor
Certification, Adjustment of Status, The Reach of Deportation, and Entry by Fraud, 17 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 265, 265 (1984).
30. IRA J. KURZBAN, Kurzban’s Immigration Law Sourcebook 1 (5th ed. 1995).
31. The United States Constitution does not speak of immigration per se but
affords Congress “the right to regulate naturalization and citizenship.” Michael R.
Curran, Flickering Lamp Beside the Golden Door: Immigration, the Constitution, &
Undocumented Aliens in the 1990s, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 57, 82 (1998) (citing
the Constitution, “[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . to establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization . . . .”) U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
32. The 1790 Act established the process for becoming a naturalized citizen,
limiting it to “free white persons.” BOSWELL, supra note 9, at 4.
33. See id. at 5; KURZBAN, supra note 30, at 1. These federal enactments
include the 1875 statutes providing for the exclusion of convicts and prostitutes,
the 1882 laws imposing a head tax of 50 cents on “aliens” and providing for the
exclusions of “idiots, lunatics, convicts and persons likely to become public
charges,” and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which provided for the exclusion
of persons from China and was enforced for more than 60 years until its repeal in
1943. KURZBAN, supra note 30, at 1–2.
34. Jeffrey A. Bekiares, In Country, On Parole, Out of Luck-Regulating Away Alien
Eligibility for Adjustment of Status Contrary to Congressional Intent and Sound
Immigration Policy, 58 FLA. L. REV. 713, 718 (2006). Following World War I, the
popular fear that Southern and Eastern Europeans would inundate the United
States resulted in Congress enacting a national origin quota system in 1921.
KURZBAN, supra note 30, at 3. The quota limited the number of persons who could
immigrate to three percent of that nationality group who were enumerated in the
1910 census. Id. The 1921 quota “did not include persons from the Western
Hemisphere.” Id. In 1924, Congress passed the National Origin Quota Act (also
called the Immigration Act of 1924), which, among other things, lowered the
annual quota of immigrants allowed into the United States to 150,000 and
restricted permissible immigration to two percent of the number of persons from
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was not until 1952 that court established the core of contemporary
35
immigration law.
Following extensive and controversial congressional hearings,
36
Congress passed the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, also known as
37
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. The Act, codified in
38
Title 8 of the U.S. Code, brought U.S. immigration policy and
39
laws “under the rubric of a single statute.” The Act passed over
40
President Truman’s veto and reflected the restrictionist attitude of
the country, which was in the aftermath of World War II and in the
wake of the Korean War, McCarthyism, and the Cold War with
41
Russia. Among other things, the 1952 Act enumerated exclusion
and
deportation
grounds,
established
procedures
for
42
denaturalization, established a visa preference system based on
family relationships and skills necessary to the economy, and
43
established relief from deportation.
Significantly, the Act also
that country enumerated in the 1890 census. BOSWELL, supra note 9, at 7;
KURZBAN, supra note 30, at 3.
35. Bekiares, supra note 34, at 718.
36. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
37. BOSWELL, supra note 9, at 8–9.
38. All statutory references in this case note will be made to the INA, and not
to the U.S.C.
39. Bekiares, supra note 34, at 718.
40. President Truman vetoed the bill, saying:
This quota system—always based upon assumptions at variance with our
American ideals—is long since out of date . . . . The greatest vice of the
present quota system, however, is that it discriminates, deliberately and
intentionally, against many of the peoples of the world . . . . The basis of
this quota system was false and unworthy in 1924. It is even worse
now. . . . It is incredible to me that, in this year of 1952, we should again
be enacting into law such a slur on the patriotism, the capacity, and the
decency of a large part of our citizenry.
Today, we are “protecting” ourselves as we were in 1924, against
being flooded by immigrants from Eastern Europe. This is fantastic. The
countries of Eastern Europe have fallen under the communist yoke . . .
no one passes their borders. In no other realm of our national life are
we so hampered and stultified by the dead hand of the past, as we are in
this field of immigration.
Austin R. Fragomen, Jr. & Alfred J. Del Rey, Jr., The Immigration Selection System: A
Proposal for Reform, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 5 n.27 (1979) (quoting Truman, The
President’s Veto Message (June 25, 1952), reprinted in PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME 277–79 (1953)).
41. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 5, at 5.
42. Generally speaking, denaturalization is the process whereby the order
admitting a person for United States citizenship is revoked and the certificate of
naturalization is cancelled. BOSWELL, supra note 9, at 182; INA § 340, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1451 (2006).
43. KURZBAN, supra note 30, at 4; BOSWELL, supra note 9, at 8–9.
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provided a way for non-citizens to adjust their status to that of
lawful permanent residents without having to leave the United
44
States.
Since 1952, the Act has been altered or amended dozens of
45
Some commentators have
times, sometimes significantly.
described it as among the country’s most controversial policies and,
with the exception of the Internal Revenue Code, the longest, most
46
Yet,
complicated piece of legislation in modern U.S. history.
despite its numerous amendments and complex history, the 1952
Act still remains the basic framework for modern immigration and
47
nationality law.
44. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 667 (1978).
45. Bekiares, supra note 34, at 718. Examples of amendments to the INA
include: the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) [Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)] (includes establishing new
and far-reaching grounds of inadmissibility and redefining aggravated felonies);
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) [Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)] (includes establishing deportation provisions for
persons deemed to be terrorists, summary exclusion procedures for persons
deemed inadmissible under INA §§ 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7), expanded criteria
for crimes of moral turpitude by including persons convicted of crimes where a
sentence of a year or more could be imposed, eliminating INA § 212(c) relief for
persons facing deportation for conviction of a crime); Immigration Act of 1990
[Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)] (includes altering preference system
and certain nonimmigrant categories, establishing Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) programs); Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 [Pub. L. No. 100-690,
102 Stat. 4181 (1988); 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5937] (includes establishing provisions
for aggravated felons); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)
[Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986)] (includes establishing sanctions
against employers for hiring persons not authorized to work in the U.S. and
programs to grant amnesty and residency to certain groups of non-citizens);
Immigration Act of 1965 [Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911] (includes eliminating
racial and national origin quotas and creating a category of immediate relatives);
Homeland Security Act of 2002 [Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); H.R.
RES. 5005, 107TH CONG. (2002)] (includes abolishing the Immigration and
Naturalization Service and placing its functions within the new Department of
Homeland Security or Department of Health and Human Services); Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments Act of 1986 [Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537
(1986), H.R. RES. 3737, 99TH CONG. (1986)] (includes establishing conditional
resident status based on marriage to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident,
preventing a person from adjusting for two years where the person marries during
deportation or exclusion proceedings, creating greater restrictions on entry for
persons charged with material misrepresentations on visa applications, at entry or
when acquiring other immigration benefits).
46. See Bekiares, supra note 34, at 718 (quoting ELIZABETH HULL, JUSTICE FOR
ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS 20 (1985)).
47. BOSWELL, supra note 9, at 8; Reid v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,
420 U.S. 619, 621 (1975) (stating that “[a]lthough the McCarran-Walter Act has
been repeatedly amended, it still is the basic structure dealing with immigration
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B. Adjustment of Status Under INA section 245(a)
1.

Background

“Adjustment of status” is a process by which someone becomes
a lawful permanent resident of the United States without having to
48
leave the country. Lawful permanent residence is “the status of
having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing
permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance
49
with the immigration laws.” Adjusting one’s status to that of a
lawful permanent resident is one of the main ways of eventually
50
becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen.
For many years, a non-citizen otherwise eligible for lawful
permanent residency could not become a permanent resident from
51
inside the United States. Instead, the person had to first depart
the United States, obtain an immigrant visa at an American
consulate abroad (generally in his or her home country), and then
52
return to the United States.
In effect, the non-citizen was
53
required to leave the country in order to come right back. This
illogical requirement caused monetary and emotional hardship for
54
the individual and his or her family.
It also generated
55
unnecessary paperwork and delays for the agencies involved. As a
56
result, the Immigration and Naturalization Service devised the
57
This program allowed
pre-examination program in 1935.
and nationality”).
48. 4 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 51.01[1][a]
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2008).
49. INA § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).
50. Bekiares, supra note 34, at 714.
51. Joe A. Tucker, Assimilation to the United States: A Study of the Adjustment of
Status and the Immigration Marriage Fraud Statutes, 7 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 20, 42
(1989).
52. Foster, supra note 10, at 37.
53. See id. at 38.
54. Tucker, supra note 51, at 42.
55. Foster, supra note 10, at 38.
56. Effective November 25, 2002, Congress abolished the INS and placed its
functions within the new Department of Homeland Security or the Department of
Health and Human Services. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, PL No. 107-296,
Tit. IV, Subtit. E, § 462, Subtit. F, § 471 116 Stat. 2137 (2002) [hereinafter
Homeland Security Act]. The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services
(now Citizenship & Immigration Services) was given jurisdiction over the
adjudication of visa petitions and adjustment of status applications. Homeland
Security Act, Subtit. E, § 451(b)(1); KURZBAN, supra note 30, at 16.
57. Tucker, supra note 51, at 43; Foster, supra note 10, at 37.
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applicants to appear before an American consulate officer in
58
Canada rather than having to travel to their countries of origin.
Yet, this process still necessitated a pointless departure for
59
applicants and an unnecessary paper shuffle for INS.
In 1952, Congress eliminated pre-examination when it enacted
section 245 of the Act, which provided that “aliens lawfully in the
United States in a temporary status may, under prescribed
conditions, have their status adjusted to that of permanent
60
residency without the necessity of leaving the United States.” The
ability to adjust one’s status in the United States saved considerable
time and money for both the applicant and government and also
61
avoided emotional hardship on families.
Yet, while adjusting status under section 245 obviated the need
for a costly journey abroad, Congress attached such stringent
conditions to the provision that few applicants could take
62
advantage of the benefit. Among other things, Congress limited
eligibility to persons who had entered the country as a bona fide
63
nonimmigrant and continued to maintain that nonimmigrant
64
The
status at the time of the adjustment-of-status application.
58. Tucker, supra note 51, at 43; Foster, supra note 10, at 37.
59. Foster, supra note 10, at 38.
60. Foster, supra note 10, at 38 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
128 (1979)).
61. Foster, supra note 10, at 39; Tucker, supra note 51, at 42. A critical
modern advantage of adjusting status (as opposed to leaving the United States for
consular processing) is avoiding the ground of inadmissibility in section
212(a)(9)(B) of the Act. INA § 212(a)(9)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006). Under that
section, if an individual is unlawfully present in the United States for more than
180 days but less than one year, voluntarily departs the United States before the
commencement of proceedings, and attempts to return to the United States in less
than three years, he or she is inadmissible. INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C.
§1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). Similarly, if an individual is unlawfully present in the
United States for one year or more, voluntarily departs the United States, and
attempts to return in less than 10 years, he or she is inadmissible. INA
§ 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). But an applicant who can
adjust status in the United States (and avoid a departure) is not subject to the
unlawful presence bar. See Tucker, supra note 51, at 29.
62. Foster, supra note 10, at 39.
63. The Act does not define the word “nonimmigrant” in the statute. It does,
however, list classes of nonimmigrants in section 101(a)(15) in the context of
defining the term “immigrant.” INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (stating
that “[t]he term ‘immigrant’ means every alien except an alien who is within one
of the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens . . .”).
64. Tucker, supra note 51, at 43. Other limitations to adjusting status under
section 245 of the 1952 Act included the following: the filing of an adjustment
application terminated a person’s nonimmigrant status, the benefit was

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

11

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 8

2008]

OROZCO v. MUKASEY

79

result was that many people still had to leave the country in order
65
to achieve permanent residency.
It became increasingly “obvious that the 1952 restrictions
would have to be relaxed . . . in order for adjustment of status to
66
Since then, numerous congressional
work effectively.”
amendments have been made to section 245, removing many of the
67
restrictive provisions of the 1952 Act along with adding others.
unavailable to individuals from western hemisphere countries, and it excluded
spouses or children of citizens unless they had been in the country for at least one
year before acquiring eligibility. Id.
65. Tamara K. Fogg, Comment, Adjustment of Status Under Section 245 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 165, 170 (1982).
66. Foster, supra note 10, at 40.
67. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008). Amendments to section
245 include the following: in 1957, Congress allowed adjustments to certain
approved specialist personnel on oversubscribed quotas and to certain former
diplomatic personnel; in 1958, Congress removed the requirement that noncitizens have maintained temporary status under which they were admitted, Act of
Aug. 21, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-700, 72 Stat. 699 (1958); the 1960 amendment
eliminated the requirement of admission as a bona fide nonimmigrant, Joint
Resolution of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, § 10, 74 Stat. 504, 505 (1960); a
1965 amendment removed the language making the provisions inapplicable to
natives of any contiguous country or adjacent island, instead making the provision
inapplicable to natives of any country of the Western Hemisphere, as well as any
adjacent island, Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 13(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919
(1965); a 1976 amendment ended the ban on Western Hemisphere non-citizens
from adjusting status and inserted a new restriction barring adjustment for any
non-citizen who thereafter remained in, or accepted employment without prior
authorization from the INS before filing an adjustment application, Immigration
and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 6, 90 Stat. 2703,
2705-06 (1976); a 1981 amendment provided that persons who accepted
unauthorized employment may also apply for adjustment of status under § 245 if
they are special immigrants as described in the Act, Immigration and Nationality
Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 5(d)(2), 95 Stat. 1611, 1614
(1981); in 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which
made adjustment unavailable to those, with certain exceptions, who are in
unlawful status when filing or who have failed to maintain a lawful status since
entry and barred entrants under the newly-enacted visa waiver pilot program,
other than immediate relatives, Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 117, 100 Stat. 3359, 3384; the Immigration Act of 1990 made
additional changes with regard to the marriage fraud provisions, among other
things; in 1994, Congress enacted a major change by permitting adjustment under
a new § 245(i) to those ineligible under subsection (a) of § 245 for entering
without inspection, and to those disqualified under subsection (c), Act of Aug. 26,
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-317, § 506(b), 108 Stat. 1724, 1765–66 (1994); the
November 26, 1997, amendment established a new § 245(k) for the benefit of
adjustment applicants who qualify for a visa number under the first three
employment-based (EB) preferences or under EB-4 as a religious minister or
worker, Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 111(c)(2), 111 Stat. 2440,
2458–59 (1997); and legislation enacted on December 21, 2000, facilitated the
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For example, in 1960, the requirement of entry as a bona fide
68
Instead,
nonimmigrant was finally dropped from section 245.
Congress added as a requirement that non-citizens be “inspected
and admitted or paroled into the United States” in order to adjust
69
“This change
their status to lawful permanent residents.
broadened the category of individuals eligible for adjustment of
70
status relief.” Over time, adjustment of status gradually evolved
into an effective tool for non-citizens in the United States to
71
become lawful permanent residents.
2.

Current Provision

Today, section 245(a) of the Act provides that:
The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted
or paroled into the United States . . . may be adjusted by
the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such
regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien
makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is
72
eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to
the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an
immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time
73
his application is filed.
Thus, eligibility under section 245(a) depends in the first
adjustment of certain applicants under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central
American Relief Act, LIFE Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. D,
tit. XV, § 1502(a), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-324 (2000). See also 4 GORDON ET AL.,
supra note 48, § 51.01[2], [3]; Fogg, supra note 65, at 171–75; Foster, supra note
10, at 41–46.
68. Joint Resolution of July 14, 1960, § 10, 74 Stat. at 505; 4 GORDON ET AL.,
supra note 48, § 51.01[1][b].
69. Joint Resolution of July 14, 1960, § 10, 74 Stat. at 505. See also Succar v.
Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2005).
70. Succar, 394 F.3d at 33 (citing S. Rep. No. 86-1651 (1960), reprinted in 1960
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3125).
71. Tucker, supra note 51, at 44.
72. There are three types of immigrant visas: (1) family-sponsored immigrant
visas, (2) employment-based immigrant visas, and (3) diversity immigrant visas.
Succar, 394 F.3d at 14 n.6 (citation omitted). Non-citizens seeking an immigrant
visa must first receive approval of an immigrant visa petition, which is usually filed
by a relative or employer. Id. at 14–15. The non-citizen must then wait for and
receive an immigrant visa number, which means that a visa has been assigned. Id.
For immediate relatives (spouses, parents, and children of United States citizens),
an immigrant visa number is automatically available upon approval of the visa
petition. Id. at n.6 (citation omitted).
73. INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006).
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instance upon the characterization of the individual’s arrival in the
74
United States. Only a person who is “inspected and admitted” or
75
76
paroled may qualify for adjustment of status under this section.
Notwithstanding what may seem like a straightforward term,
there has been considerable discussion among commentators and
the courts over the term “admission,” and most recently, about its
77
meaning within the context of section 245(a).
C. The Term “Admission”
1.

Entry vs. Admission

Admission is an important concept in immigration laws. Not
only is it one of the statutory requirements for adjusting status
78
under section 245(a), but it is the key factor in determining which
of two grounds apply in the context of removing a non-citizen from
79
If the
the United States: “inadmissibility” or “deportability.”
74. 4 GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, § 51.06.
75. The term “parole” is not defined in the Act. 5 GORDON ET AL., supra note
48, § 62.01[1]. Parole may encompass a variety of situations in which temporary
entry or stay in the United States is authorized. Id. This may include parole into
the United States to receive medical treatment, prevent inhumane separation of
families, or to enable entry as a witness or defendant in a criminal case. Id. See also
Emokah v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 110, 118 n.10 (2nd Cir. 2008) (defining parole as
“an administrative practice whereby the government allows an arriving alien who
has come to a port-of-entry without a valid entry document to be temporarily
released from detention and to remain in the United States pending review of . . .
his immigration status”) (quoting Ibragimov v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 125, 131 (2d
Cir. 2007)).
76. In certain situations, former INA § 245(i) permits some individuals to
adjust their status to permanent residents even if they entered the United States
without inspection. INA § 245(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). That section, however, is
beyond the scope of this case note and expired on April 30, 2001. LIFE Act
Amendments of 2000, § 1502(a)(1)(B), 114 Stat. at 2763A-324. Additionally, noncitizens who have an approved petition for classification as a VAWA [Violence
Against Women Act] self-petitioner are eligible to adjust their status despite not
having been “inspected and admitted” to the United States. See INA § 245(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1255(a) (“the status of any other alien having an approved petition for
classification as a VAWA self-petitioner may be adjusted by the Attorney General . .
. to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if . . .”).
77. See, e.g., MARY KENNEY & BETH WERLIN, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW
FOUNDATION (2008) Practice Advisory, Orozco v. Mukasey: Current Status of the Case and
Preliminary Strategies 5 (2008), http://www.ailf.org/lac/pa/orozco-pa.pdf
[hereinafter “AILF PRACTICE ADVISORY”]; Gerald Seipp, Federal Case Summaries, 85
No. 15 Interpreter Releases 1075, 1076–77 (Apr. 7, 2008).
78. INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
79. “Removal” is the ejection of the person from the United States. BOSWELL,
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person has been “admitted” to the United States, the grounds of
deportability apply; if he or she has not been admitted, the grounds
80
of inadmissibility apply.
An important distinction between the
two grounds relates to burdens of proof. If a non-citizen is seeking
admission (thus facing the grounds of inadmissibility), the
individual has the burden of showing that he or she is either a U.S.
81
citizen or not inadmissible under any provision of the Act. If the
non-citizen has been admitted (thus facing the deportability
grounds), the government has the burden of proving that the
individual comes within one of the enumerated grounds of
82
deportability in the Act. The inadmissibility grounds are set out
in section 212(a) of the Act; the grounds of deportability are found
in section 237(a).
The structure of the current removal proceedings began on
April 1, 1997, when Congress passed the Illegal Immigration
83
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).
Before this, the grounds of inadmissibility were referred to as
“grounds of exclusion,” and there were two different types of
hearings: exclusion hearings (in which the non-citizen had to prove
that he or she was admissible to the United States) and deportation
hearings (INS had the burden of proving the grounds by which it
84
could force a person to leave the country).
Under this pre-IIRIRA system, the determining factor as to
which of the two provisions applied depended upon whether the
85
person had gained “entry” into the United States—not whether he
86
or she was admitted. The BIA has interpreted the term “entry” to
supra note 9, at 24. Any person who is not a United States citizen or national can
be removed. IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., A GUIDE FOR IMMIGRATION ADVOCATES 3-2
(2001 ed. Supp. 2003) [hereinafter ILRC GUIDE]. A “removal proceeding” is the
court process that determines whether someone will be removed from the United
States. Id. at 10–11.
80. ILRC GUIDE, supra note 79, at 10-2.
81. INA § 240(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2); BOSWELL, supra note 9, at 34–35;
82. INA § 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A); ILRC GUIDE, supra note
79, at 3-2.
83. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.); ILRC GUIDE, supra note 79, at 3-3.
84. ILRC GUIDE, supra note 79, at 3-3.
85. Entry was defined under former INA § 101(a)(13) as “any coming of an
alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying
possession . . . .” INA § 101(1)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994); In re Connelly,
19 I. & N. Dec. 156, 159 (B.I.A. 1984).
86. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 5, § 1:5.2, at 1–28; ILRC GUIDE, supra note
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mean “(1) a crossing into the territorial limits of the United States,
i.e. physical presence; plus (2) inspection and admission by an
immigration officer; or (3) actual and intentional evasion of
inspection at the nearest inspection point, coupled with (4)
87
freedom from restraint.”
The former “entry” definition “generated much litigation and
88
intellectual heartburn.” It meant that non-citizens who entered
the United States without inspection still technically made an
“entry” into the United States and, therefore, had the “advantage”
of facing deportation grounds (instead of exclusion) in which the
89
onus was on the government to prove that they were deportable.
That all changed when Congress passed IIRIRA in 1996.
Among other things, IIRIRA combined the separate exclusion
and deportation proceedings into a unified “removal”
90
proceeding. Congress still retained two separate sets of grounds
91
under which non-citizens may be charged but changed the name
of the exclusion grounds to inadmissibility grounds (keeping the
grounds of deportability). Importantly, with IIRIRA also came the
shift in emphasis from the concept of “entry” to that of
92
“admission.”
IIRIRA eliminated the definition of “entry” in former INA
section 101(a)(13) and replaced it with the term “admission”
93
under section 101(a)(13)(A), which means the “lawful entry of
the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization
94
by an immigration officer.” Congress also amended former INA
79, at 3-4.
87. In re Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec. 467, 468 (B.I.A. 1973) (citations omitted).
88. See State Department Cable (no. 96–State–239978) to All Diplomatic and
Consular Posts (Nov. 20, 1996), reprinted in State Dep’t Explains “Admission” and
“Removal” Under New Law, 73 No. 46 INTERPRETER RELEASES at 1693 (Dec. 9, 1996).
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1994).
90. In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616, 620 (B.I.A. 1999).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009; FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 5,
§ 1:5.2, at 1–28.
94. INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006). INA
§ 101(a)(13)(A) states in full: “The terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with
respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Note that Congress did
not completely abandon the term “entry,” but rather incorporated it into the new
definition. See Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 628. (Rosenberg, Board Member,
concurring and dissenting) (stating that “[h]ere, Congress adopted and continued
to use the term ‘entry,’ and only modified with it the word ‘lawful,’ so that for
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section 212(a)(6)(A) to render inadmissible “an alien present in
95
the United States without being admitted or paroled. . . .” This
ground is a parallel provision to the ground of removal, section
237(a)(1)(A), which renders removable non-citizens inadmissible
96
These changes
“at the time of entry or adjustment of status.”
make it unmistakably clear that non-citizens who enter the United
States without inspection are not “admitted” and cannot get the
“benefit” of being subject to the grounds of deportability (versus
97
the grounds of inadmissibility). Thus, “[i]n practical terms, the
IIRIRA system changed what happens to people who entered [the
98
United States] without inspection.” It did not, however, change
any of the language in section 245(a) relating to adjusting one’s
99
status to that of a lawful permanent resident.
2.

Multiple References in INA

“[T]he question of the point at which an ‘admission’ to the
United States occurs and the form that it takes comes up in several
100
contexts.” The “ultimate interpretation . . . can be critical” to an
individual’s ability to avoid removal from the United States and/or

purposes of an ‘admission,’ the entry had to follow inspection and
authorization.”).
95. INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (“An alien present in
the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United
States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is
inadmissible.”).
96. INA § 237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (“Any alien who at the
time of entry or adjustment of status was within one or more of the classes of aliens
inadmissible by the law existing at such time is deportable.”).
97. Elwin Griffith, Admission and Cancellation of Removal Under the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 979, 988 n.61 (2005) (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 226 (1996) and quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 208 (1996)
(Conf. Rep.)) (stating “‘[t]he current category of persons who are deportable
because they have made an entry without inspection will, under the amendments
made by section 301(c) of this bill, instead be considered inadmissible under
revised paragraph (6)(A) of subsection 212(a)’”). See also Ortega-Cervantes v.
Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[p]rior to IIRIRA,
aliens ‘who entered the United States without inspection or at any time or place
other than as designated by the Attorney General’ would have been subject to
deportation. Now, under IIRIRA, aliens ‘present in the United States who ha[ve]
not been admitted’ . . . are . . . ‘applicant[s] for admission.’”(citations omitted)).
98. ILRC GUIDE, supra note 79, at 3-4.
99. See Akhtar v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 587, 590 (5th Cir. 2006).
100. Lory Diana Rosenberg, Separate Opinion – The Cost of Admission: Adjusting
the Before and After of “Inspection and Authorization” Under § 101(a)(13)(A), 9-8
BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1, 1 (2004).
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101

obtain permanent residency.
In some provisions, the term serves mainly as a temporal
102
one.
For example, section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) refers to “a five-year
period after the date of admission during which a non-citizen
103
committed” a crime involving moral turpitude, meaning that the
admission date serves as the start of the five-year running period.
In other provisions, the term is used in the context of an entry into
the United States after inspection and authorization, for example
INA sections:
• conviction of multiple criminal offenses after admission. INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(ii),
• conviction of an aggravated felony at any time after admission.
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii),
• conviction of a violation relating to a controlled substance
after admission (other than a single offense for less than 30
grams of marijuana). INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i),
• being a drug abuser after admission. INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(ii),
• conviction of various firearms offenses after admission. INA
§ 237(a)(2)(C),
• conviction of a crime of domestic violence, stalking, child
abuse, neglect or abandonment, or violation of a protection
104
order after admission. INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i) and (ii), and
• 245(a) (status of alien who was inspected and admitted or
105
paroled may be adjusted).
“The reach of . . . these sections . . . turn, for the most part, on
106
what constitutes an ‘admission[,]’” and, as Part IV illustrates,
interpretations of the term fluctuate depending on the particular
context.
D. Waivers Authorized for Fraud and Misrepresentation
In addition to being inspected and admitted, a non-citizen
applying for adjustment of status under section 245(a) must show

101.
102.
103.
added).
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id.; INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis
Rosenberg, supra note 100, at 1–2.
INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
Rosenberg, supra note 100, at 2.
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107

that he or she is admissible to the United States. There is a broad
range of conduct that can render someone inadmissible. One of
the more common grounds is section 212(a)(6)(C)(i), which
108
relates to conduct involving fraud or misrepresentation.
Under
that section, any non-citizen who fraudulently or willfully
misrepresents a material fact in obtaining or seeking to obtain a
visa, documentation, or admission to the United States is
109
inadmissible. Congress enacted section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) in order
to prevent non-citizens from obtaining entry into the country by
fraudulent means and then, once this is exposed, continuing with
110
the immigration application process as if nothing happened.
Recognizing the harsh results of lifetime inadmissibility on
non-citizens and their families, however, Congress enacted a waiver
111
under section 212(i) for qualified individuals. A waiver generally
serves to temporarily or permanently remove, or “forgive,” a
112
particular ground of inadmissibility or deportability.
A waiver
107. INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
108. See KURZBAN, supra note 30, at 74.
109. Id.; INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) provides: “Any alien who, by fraud or willfully
misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has
procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or
other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.” INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). The fraud or misrepresentation under section
212(a)(6)(C)(i) is somewhat limited in scope.
See Steven A. Morley,
Fraud/Misrepresentation Bar and § 212(i) Waiver: Don’t Waive Goodbye, IMMIGRATION &
NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 426, 427 (Richard J. Link et al. eds., 2007-2008 ed.).
To be inadmissible under § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), it must be determined that (1) a
misrepresentation was made by the applicant, (2) the misrepresentation was
willful, and (3) the fact misrepresented was material, or (4) the non-citizen used
“fraud to procure a visa or other documentation to receive a benefit under the
[Act].” 17-1 Foreign Affairs Manual – Visas, 22 C.F.R. § 40.63, N2 (2008).
110. 17-1 Foreign Affairs Manual – Visas, 22 C.F.R. § 40.63, N2 (2008).
111. See 5-63 Immigration Law and Procedure § 63.07(3)(f)(i) (stating that
“[a]s originally enacted, the perpetual inadmissibility of a non-citizen who made
misrepresentations, regardless of his or her qualifications and family attachments,
produced many hardships.”); In re Lopez-Monzon, 17 I. & N. Dec. 280, 281
(Comm. 1979) (stating that “[t]he intent of Congress in adding this provision of
law, which is evident from its language, was to provide for the unification of
families, thereby avoiding the hardship of separation”).
112. 14-1 INS Manuals 17.5(a); ILRC GUIDE, supra note 79, at 6-12. The INA
permits waivers of inadmissibility and deportability in many circumstances.
Examples of inadmissibility waivers include section 211(b) (waiver for returning
resident immigrants); section 212(a)(3)(D)(ii), (iii), (waiver for immigrant
membership in totalitarian party); section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) (waiver of unlawful
presence); section 2 (waiver for nonimmigrants willing to provide government
with information relating to a criminal enterprise); section 212(d)(4) (waiver of
documentation requirements for nonimmigrants); section 212(d)(11) (waiver of
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granted under section 212(i) essentially forgives a non-citizen’s
inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) due to fraud or
113
misrepresentation.
Previously, section 212(i) was expanded by the Immigration
114
to allow a waiver for fraud or
Act of 1990 (“IMMACT90”)
misrepresentation under former INA section 212(i)(1) for the
spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a U.S. citizen or lawful
115
permanent resident. For non-citizens lacking the requisite family
relationship, IMMACT90 also permitted a waiver in circumstances

alien smuggling provision); section 212(d)(12) (waiver for non-citizen subject of a
final order for violation of 274C for document fraud); section 212(e) (waiver from
two-year foreign residence requirement for persons with J-1 visas); section
212(g)(1) (waiver of inadmissibility for communicable disease); section 212(g)(2)
(waiver of failure to present proper vaccination documents); section 212(g)(3)
(waiver for physical or mental disorder); section 212(h) (waiver of certain criminal
grounds); section 212(i), (waiver of certain misrepresentations); section 212(k)
(waiver to admit certain non-citizens who are inadmissible under particular
provisions who are in possession of an immigrant visa); and section
210(c)(2)(B)(i) (except as otherwise provided, attorney general may waive any
provision of section 212(a), for humanitarian purposes). See 14-1 INS Manuals
17.5(a).
Examples of deportability waivers include section 237(a)(1)(E)(iii)
(waiver for alien smuggling); section 237(a)(1)(H) (waiver for certain
misrepresentations); section 237(a)(2)(A)(v) (waiver for certain crimes upon
grant of a pardon); section 237(a)(3)(C)(ii) (waiver for individual subject to final
order for violation of section 274C relating to document fraud); and section
237(c) (waiver of certain grounds for “special immigrants” described in section
101(a)(27)(J).
This case note addresses only two waivers: section 212(i), and section
237(a)(1)(H).
113. Note that a section 212(i) waiver does not apply to false claims of United
States citizenship under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). Steven A. Morley, supra note
109, at 428. Under that section, “[a]ny alien who falsely represents, or has falsely
represented, himself or herself to be a citizen of the United States for any purpose
or benefit under this Act (including section 274A of this title) or any other
Federal or State law is inadmissible.” INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). No waiver is available for inadmissibility under that
section. Morley, supra note 109, at 428. However, a non-citizen is inadmissible
under that section only for false citizenship claims made on or after the enactment
of IIRIRA on September 30, 1996. Id. False claims made before this are treated as
standard misrepresentations under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i). Id. See also State Dept.
Instructs on Consequences of False Citizenship Claims, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES (Fed.
Publ’n, Inc., Wash., D.C.), Sept. 29, 1997, at 1483 (stating that “[f]alse claims to
U.S. citizenship made prior to Sep. 30, 1996 should be examined under INA
§ 212(a)(6)(C)(i)”).
114. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
115. HELEN A. SKLAR ET AL., NATIONAL IMMIGRATION PROJECT, IMMIGRATION ACT
OF 1990 TODAY § 9:73 (2008).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/8

20

Shugall and Desnoyers: Orozco v. Mukasey: When an Entry May Not Be an "Admission"? and t

88

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1
116

where ten years had passed since the date of the fraudulent act.
117
First, a
Yet, IIRIRA significantly curtailed section 212(i) relief.
212(i) waiver was no longer available to the parents of U.S. citizens
118
or lawful permanent residents. IIRIRA also removed the ten-year
provision, restricting the benefits of the waiver only to those who
119
have the stated family relationship.
Further, Congress raised the
threshold for granting section 212(i) waivers, requiring a showing
of “extreme hardship” to the non-citizen’s qualifying family
120
Additionally, under
member if the waiver is not approved.
121
IIRIRA, judicial review of a section 212(i) waiver is barred.
Thus, in its present form, section 212(i) waives inadmissibility
for fraud or misrepresentation under 212(a)(6)(C)(i) only if the
non-citizen can prove that his or her lawful permanent resident or
U.S. citizen spouse or parent will suffer extreme hardship if the
122
admission to the United States is refused.
Additionally, the
116. Id. § 9:40; see State Dept. Instructs on Waivers of Ineligibility Provisions of
1996 Act (Oct. 31, 1996), in 73 Interpreter Releases 1588, 1589 (Nov. 11, 1996).
117. SKLAR ET AL., supra note 115; see Morley, supra note 109, at 426 (stating
that “the enactment of IIRIRA altered the scheme dramatically”). Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996).
118. KURZBAN supra note 30, at 76; SKLAR ET AL., supra note 115; compare INA
§ 212(i) (2006) (now called “inadmissible aliens”) with INA § 212(i) (1995) (then
called “excludable aliens”). This means that the qualifying relative for purposes of
section 212(i) is now limited to only a lawful permanent resident or United States
citizen spouse or parent. Morley, supra note 109, at 429.
119. 5 GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, § 63.07[3][f][iii)]; KURZBAN supra note
30, at 76; State Dept. Instructs on Waivers of Ineligibility Provisions of 1996 Act
(Oct. 31, 1996) supra note 116, at 1589.
120. 5 GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, § 63.07[3][f][i]; Morley, supra note 109,
at 426; SKLAR ET AL., supra note 115, § 9:73; see infra Part V.A (detailing the factors
that the BIA outlined in In re Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 560 (B.I.A. 1991)
(determining whether extreme hardship has been established)).
121. INA § 212(i)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006) (stating “[n]o court shall have
jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a
waiver under paragraph (1)”); SKLAR ET AL., supra note 115 § 9:73.
122. INA § 212(i)(1) provides:
The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General,
waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) of this section
in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a
United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General
that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien
would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident
spouse or parent of such an alien . . . .
Id. It should be noted that even if someone meets the legal standard of a 212(i)
waiver, it is still within the Attorney General’s discretion whether to ultimately
approve the waiver. See INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
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benefit of a 212(i) waiver is discretionary, meaning that the
application may still be denied even if the non-citizen meets all of
123
the statutory requirements.
If the non-citizen is outside the
United States, a 212(i) waiver is submitted to a consular officer in
124
If the individual
connection with an immigrant visa application.
is inside the United States, the 212(i) waiver application is filed
with the CIS field office director or with the Immigration Judge if
125
the person is in removal proceedings.
Unlike the grounds of inadmissibility, the grounds of
deportability apply to non-citizens who have already been admitted
126
There are several removal provisions
to the United States.
127
unique to the deportability grounds.
One of those provisions is
section 237(a)(1)(A), which provides that a person is removable if
he or she was inadmissible at the time of entry or adjustment of
128
In effect, the provision is a delayed finding of
status.
inadmissibility, and reaches all those individuals who managed to
enter the United States or adjust status in violation of a statute or
129
Thus, non-citizens inadmissible at the time of entry
regulation.
for having engaged in fraud or misrepresentation within the
meaning of section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) are deportable under section
237(a)(1)(A).
Like
the
lifetime
inadmissibility
under
section
212(a)(6)(C)(i), however, recurring hardships in the enforcement
of 237(a)(1)(A) eventually led to a legislative determination that
130
the provision was excessively severe.
A major concern was the

123. See INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (“The Attorney General may, in the
discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of
subsection (a)(6)(C) . . . .”); ILRC GUIDE, supra note 79, at 6-13.
124. ILRC GUIDE, supra note 79, at 6-29.
125. 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(a)(1)(ii) (2008).
126. INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (“Any alien . . . in and admitted to the
United States shall . . . be removed if the alien is within one or more of the
following classes of deportable aliens: . . . .”).
127. See BOSWELL, supra note 9, at 62 (providing examples of deportability
grounds not found in the inadmissibility section, such as a non-citizen’s failure to
maintain status under section 237(a)(1)(C) and failure to notify change of address
under section 237(a)(3)(A)).
128. See id. See also INA § 237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (“Any alien who at the
time of entry or adjustment of status was within one more of the classes of aliens
inadmissible by the law existing at such time is deportable.”).
129. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, § 71.04[1].
130. See id. § 71.04[2][a][iii][A] (“Congress enacted this provision to prevent
the break-up of families comprised in part of [United States] citizens or lawful
permanent resident aliens.”).
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impact of the provision on refugees who are often compelled to
engage in fraud in order to escape persecution in their home
131
countries and seek protection in the United States.
As a result,
legislation in 1957 and 1961 provided for a waiver of deportability,
132
Following
which was initially embodied in section 241(f).
133
extensive amendments in 1981, section 241(f) was revised and
134
replaced with section 241(a)(1)(H) in 1990 and then renamed
135
under section 237 by IIRIRA in 1996.
Section 237(a)(1)(H) now contains the current version of the
waiver and applies to a non-citizen who “is the spouse, parent, son,
or daughter” of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident and
“was in possession of an immigrant visa or equivalent document
and was otherwise admissible to the United States at the time of
136
A waiver granted under section
such admission . . . .”
131. See id. (citing Petition of Iwanenko, 145 F.Supp. 838, 843 (D.C. Ill. 1956) (“It
is also the opinion of the Conferees that the section of the bill which provides for
the exclusion of aliens who obtained travel documents by fraud or willfully
misrepresenting a material fact should not serve to exclude or to deport certain
bona fide refugees who in fear of being forcefully repatriated to their former
homelands misrepresented their place of birth on applying for a visa and such
misrepresentation did not have as its basis the desire to evade the quota provisions
of the law or an investigation in the place of their former residence”) (quoting
Congressman Walter).
132. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, § 71.04[2][a][iii][A]; INA
§ 241(f)(1961).
133. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, § 71.04[2][a][iii][A] (citing INA
Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 8, 95 Stat. 1611 (1981)).
134. Id. (citing the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 602(a),
104 Stat. 4978, 5079 (1990)).
135. Id. (citing IIRIRA § 305(a)(2)).
136. Morley, supra note 109, at 429. INA § 237(a)(1)(H), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(H) (2006), provides in its entirety:
The provisions of this paragraph relating to the removal of aliens within
the United States on the ground that they were inadmissible at the time
of admission as aliens, described in section 212(a)(6)(C)(i), whether
willful or innocent, may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, be
waived for any alien (other than an alien described in paragraph (4)(D))
who—
(i)
(I) is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United
States or of an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent
residence; and
(II) was in possession of an immigrant visa or equivalent document and
was otherwise admissible to the United States at the time of such
admission except for those grounds of inadmissibility specified under
paragraphs (5)(A) and (7)(A) of section 212(a) which were a direct
result of that fraud or misrepresentation.
(ii) is a VAWA self-petitioner.
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237(a)(1)(H) waives the non-citizen’s deportability and establishes
his or her lawful admission for permanent residence in the United
137
States.
138
Relatively few cases discuss section 237(a)(1)(H) waivers.
One example of a case in the Ninth Circuit involved a situation
where a petitioner had misrepresented her marital status upon
entering the United States and later sought a waiver of her
139
The
deportation under what is now section 237(a)(1)(H).
petitioner, a citizen of the Philippines, had applied for an
immigrant visa as a child (unmarried and under the age of twenty140
141
of her lawful permanent resident father.
Shortly
one)
thereafter, she discovered that she was pregnant and married the
142
father of the unborn child. Six days later, the petitioner entered
the United States with her immigrant visa still classified as an
143
unmarried child of a lawful permanent resident.
Later in
144
the petitioner conceded her
deportation proceedings,
145
deportability under what is now section 237(a)(1)(A) by virtue of
having obtained her visa by fraud or willful misrepresentation
A waiver of removal for fraud or misrepresentation granted under this
subparagraph shall also operate to waive removal based on the grounds
of inadmissibility directly resulting from such fraud or misrepresentation.
Note that the statute specifically excludes non-citizens subject to removal
for having participated in Nazi persecutions or for having engaged in
genocide. [Eds.]
137. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, § 71.04[2][a][iii][C].
138. Id. § 71.04[2][a][iii][A].
139. Casem v. I.N.S., 8 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 1993). At the time, the section of the
Act under which the petitioner sought a waiver was section 1251(f) (now codified
at section 237(a)(1)(H)). Id. at 701.
140. The term “child” is defined in the Act as an “unmarried person under
twenty-one years of age . . . .” INA § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1).
141. Casem, 8 F.3d at 701. Under the family-based “preference” system,
individuals in the category of petitioner are in the “second preference (2A)”
category, which include spouses and children of lawful permanent residents of the
United States. See supra note 66.
142. Casem, 8 F.3d at 701.
143. Id. After giving birth to her son in the United States, the petitioner in
Casem returned to the Philippines and remarried her husband in a church
ceremony. Id. She later returned to the United States and filed a petition on his
behalf with the INS and mentioned only the second marriage. Id. At an interview
in connection with the petition, she admitted to their first marriage and withdrew
the petition. Id. INS then initiated deportation proceedings. Id.
144. All proceedings initiated before the enactment of IIRIRA in 1996
pertaining to individuals who had made an “entry” into the United States were
called “deportation proceedings.” See supra Part II.C.1. Following IIRIRA, the
proceedings are now called “removal proceedings.” Id.
145. The ground of deportability at the time was INA § 241(a)(1) (1982).
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(entering as a child when she was actually married).
The sole
issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether the petitioner was
entitled to a waiver of her deportation under what is now section
147
237(a)(1)(H).
The Ninth Circuit ultimately remanded the
decision to the agency for failing to consider all relevant factors in
its decision dismissing the petitioner’s appeal, namely the effect of
148
petitioner’s deportation on her nine year-old U.S. citizen son.
According to the regulations, a request for a section
237(a)(1)(H) waiver may be made in removal proceedings before
149
an Immigration Judge.
III. THE OROZCO DECISION
A. The Facts
On January 11, 1996, Orozco, a citizen of Mexico, presented
150
himself for inspection at the San Ysidro, California port-of-entry.
At the time, he did not have his own valid entry or travel document
151
with which to enter the United States. Instead, Orozco presented
a permanent resident alien registration card (“green card”)
152
belonging to someone else.
Upon inspection at the checkpoint,
an immigration official allowed Orozco to enter the United
153
States.
A number of years later, on April 23, 2001, Orozco married
146. Casem, 8 F.3d at 701.
147. Id. INA section 237(a)(1)(H) was initially embodied in § 241(f), which
was later replaced with § 241(a)(1)(H).
148. Casem, 8 F.3d at 701, 703. Citing I.N.S. v. Errico., 385 U.S. 214, 225
(1966), the Ninth Circuit in Casem observed that while the waiver ground does not
contain an “extreme hardship” clause, Congress enacted the provision to prevent
the break-up of families comprised in part of United States citizens or lawful
permanent residents and, thus, the BIA must consider hardship to the children of
potential deportees along with all other relevant factors. Casem, 8 F.3d at 703.
149. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(d) (2006) (stating that “[t]he respondent may apply to
the immigration judge for relief from removal under sections 237(a)(1)(H)”); See
also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(e) (stating that “[a]n application under this section shall be
made only during the hearing . . . .”).
150. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Orozco v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2008)
(No. 06-75021) (stating that Orozco is a “native and citizen of Mexico”); Orozco v.
Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1068, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008).
151. Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1069–70.
152. Id. at 1070.
153. See id. at 1070; Brief for Petitioner at 15, Orozco, 521 F.3d 1068 (No. 0675021) (stating that it “has not been contested or challenged by the Service . . .
[that] upon inspection by said officer, Orozco was authorized to enter the U.S.”).
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154

Raquel Ontiveros (“Raquel”), a U.S. citizen.
Together they had
155
In June 2001, Raquel submitted a
two U.S. citizen children.
petition for alien relative on behalf of Orozco, who simultaneously
filed an application for adjustment of status to become a lawful
156
The INS approved Orozco’s petition for
permanent resident.
alien relative; the adjustment of status application was denied for
failure to appear at an interview in connection with the
157
application.
Immigration officials later apprehended Orozco and placed
158
him in removal proceedings on April 13, 2005. The government
charged Orozco with being removable from the United States
under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) for being present in the United
159
States without having been admitted or paroled.
Interestingly,
the government then filed an amended charge of removability
160
against Orozco under section 237(a)(1)(A),
a ground of
deportability, for being inadmissible at the time of entry for having
presented a counterfeit document to gain admission into the
161
United States.
At his hearing before the Immigration Judge, Orozco admitted
the allegations about his entry into the United States and conceded
154. Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1070.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. INA section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006) states that “[a]n alien present in
the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United
States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is
inadmissible.” See supra note 94.
160. INA § 237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (stating that “[a]ny alien
who at the time of entry or adjustment of status was within one or more of the
classes of aliens inadmissible by the law existing at such time is deportable”)
161. Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1070. The government’s amended charge under INA
§ 237(a)(1)(A) is inconsistent with its argument that Orozco was never “admitted”
to the United States. The grounds of deportability under section 237(a) only apply
to non-citizens who have been “admitted” into the United States. See INA
§ 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (stating that “[a]ny alien . . . in and admitted to the
United States shall . . . be removed if the alien is within one or more of the
following classes of deportable aliens . . . ”) (emphasis added).
Yet, at the same time, the government argued (and the court so found) that
Orozco was ineligible for adjustment of status under INA § 245(a), because he was
never admitted into the United States. See Brief for Respondent at 13, Orozco, 521
F.3d 1068 (No. 06-75021) (stating that “[t]he practical consequence is that Orozco
cannot establish eligibility for adjustment of status under INA § 245(a) because he
conceded that his entry was unlawful, and he is therefore precluded from showing
he was ‘admitted’”).
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162

removability under section 237(a)(1)(A).
He then sought relief
from removal in the form of adjustment of status under section
245(a) based on the approved visa petition previously filed by his
163
wife, Raquel.
Orozco also filed for a waiver of inadmissibility
under section 212(i) for having entered the country with someone
164
else’s green card.
The Immigration Judge determined that Orozco was
statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status because he could not
satisfy the “lawful entry” requirement of the “admission” definition
165
under section 101(a)(13)(A).
According to the judge, even if
Orozco qualified for a waiver under section 212(i), he nevertheless
166
remained statutorily ineligible to adjust under section 245(a).
In a one-member, unpublished decision, the BIA affirmed the
Immigration Judge’s decision in full, noting that Orozco was
indeed ineligible for adjustment of status because he did not
establish a lawful entry and admission under section
167
Orozco appealed the decision to the Ninth
101(a)(13)(A).
168
Circuit Court of Appeals.
B. The Court’s Analysis
The question of Orozco’s statutory eligibility for adjustment of
status under section 245(a) was an issue of first impression for the
169
Ninth Circuit.
The court began its analysis by looking at the
170
Looking first at section 245(a),
language of the statute itself.
which requires that a non-citizen be “inspected and admitted . . .
into the United States,” the court noted that the term “admitted” is

162. See Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1070.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. The Immigration Judge apparently stated on the record that he would
have granted Orozco’s adjustment application in the exercise of discretion, along
with Orozco’s accompanying INA section 212(i) waiver, if Orozco were found to
be statutorily eligible under section 245(a). See Brief for Petitioner at 8, Orozco,
521 F.3d 1068 (No. 06-75021).
166. See Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1070.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1073. The Ninth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction over
Orozco’s Petition for Review under INA section 242(a)(2)(D) to decide, as a
matter of law, whether he is statutorily eligible for adjustment of status. Id. at
1071.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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171

not defined in section 245(a). The court, however, looked to the
definition of “admission” set forth in section 101(a)(13)(A), which
applies to the entire Act and includes a “lawful entry” into the
172
United States as part of the definition.
According to the court, the statutory language of sections
245(a) and 101(a)(13)(A) unambiguously requires that a noncitizen’s entry into the United States be lawful in order to qualify
173
for adjustment of status under section 245(a).
Orozco argued that he satisfied the admission requirement in
section 245(a) when he presented himself for questioning before
the immigration official at the San Ysidro port-of-entry and was
174
The court
thereafter granted permission to enter the country.
rejected this argument. Although it did not explain what actually
constitutes a “lawful entry,” the court said that “it requires
something more than simply presenting oneself for inspection and
175
being allowed to enter the United States.”
The court then gave several reasons in support of its
conclusion that lawful entry is a statutory prerequisite to
adjustment under section 245(a). First, it noted that its holding is
176
“in accord” with 8 Code of Federal Regulation section 101.2,
which clarifies that the agency may create a record of a previous
admission where none exists or correct an erroneous record of an
admission, provided the error was not a result of deliberate
177
deception or fraud on the part of the non-citizen.
171. Id.
172. Id. See also INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006)
(stating that “[t]he terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an
alien, lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer.”).
173. Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1072.
174. Id. at 1070.
175. Id. at 1072.
176. A regulation is a rule promulgated by the agency pursuant to the
requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The definition of a
“rule” is “an agency statement of . . . future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy . . . .” APA § 551(4), 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2008).
177. 8 CFR § 101.2 (2008). The regulation provides:
An alien who entered the United States as either an immigrant or
nonimmigrant under any of the following circumstances shall be
regarded as having been lawfully admitted in such status, except as
otherwise provided in this part: An alien otherwise admissible whose
entry was made and recorded under other than his full true and correct
name or whose entry record contains errors in recording sex, names of
relatives, or names of foreign places of birth or residence, provided that
he establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the
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Without discussing how the regulation is in accord with
Orozco’s situation, the court moved on to the next reason in
support of its holding. The court explained that it applied section
101(a)(13)(A) in an earlier case that involved a different ground of
178
removability, Shivaramen v. Ashcroft. In that case, it found that the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had unreasonably interpreted
the person’s “date of admission” in section 237(a)(2)(A)(i)
(related to a crime involving moral turpitude) to mean the date he
adjusted status instead of the date he lawfully entered the United
179
The court said that in reaching that conclusion, it
States.
observed that INA section 101(a)(13)(A) leaves no room for doubt,
“unambiguously defining admission as the lawful entry of the alien
180
into the United States.”
Citing two criminal fraud statutes, the court then observed that
181
Orozco’s entry into the United States was not lawful and that
“absurd results” would follow if his entry, while criminal, was
182
deemed lawful for purposes of section 245(a).
record of the claimed admission relates to him, and, if entry occurred on
or after May 22, 1918, if under other than his full, true and correct name
that he also establishes that the name was not adopted for the purpose of
concealing his identity when obtaining a passport or visa, or for the
purpose of using the passport or visa of another person or otherwise
evading any provision the immigration laws, and that the name used at
the time of entry was one by which he had been known for a sufficient
length of time prior to making application for a passport or visa to have
permitted the issuing authority or authorities to have made any necessary
investigation concerning him or that his true identity was known to such
officials.
178. Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1072 (citing Shivaramen v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1142,
1147 (9th Cir. 2004)).
179. Shivaramen, 360 F.3d at 1143.
180. Id. at 1146.
181. Id. (citing two criminal fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a) (2006) and
1028(a)(7) (2006)). 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006) provides for a fine and/or
imprisonment for an individual who knowingly and willfully “makes any materially
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation” or “makes or uses any
false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2006)
prohibits an individuals from using “a means of identification of another person
with the intent to commit . . . any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of
Federal law.”
182. Shivaramen, 360 F.3d at 1146 (citing Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477,
482 (9th Cir. 2001) (relating to avoiding absurd results, if possible, when
interpreting a statute)). The court said, “Orozco asks us to turn a blind eye to
criminal and fraudulent acts underlying his entry, because he arrived at an
authorized border crossing station and presented himself for inspection.” Orozco,
521 F.3d at 1072.
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Next, the court rejected several arguments that Orozco raised
183
in his appeal. It first rejected his argument that the Immigration
Judge erred in declining to follow the BIA’s published decision in
184
In re Areguillin.
The court found Areguillin “of no persuasive
value” in light of IIRIRA, which, it said, altered the statutory
185
framework upon which the decision rested. The court explained
that prior to IIRIRA, the term “admission” was not defined and that
in light of the amendment, now requiring a lawful entry, Congress
“unambiguously required lawful entry into the United States as a
statutory prerequisite to adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. section
186
1255(a).”
Finally, the court rejected Orozco’s argument that his waiver
187
under section 212(i) renders him eligible to adjust his status.
According to the court, “eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility
does not make Orozco’s underlying entry into the United States
188
lawful.”
The court then concluded that the Immigration Judge
and BIA correctly found Orozco statutorily ineligible for
189
adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act.
On March 25, 2008, the Ninth Circuit filed its decision
190
dismissing Orozco’s petition for review.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE OROZCO DECISION
In reaching its decision in Orozco, the Ninth Circuit seemed to
construe the term “admission” in somewhat of a vacuum. While
the definition of “admitted” in section 101(a)(13)(A) seems clear
at first glance, the meaning is not so plain and should be
considered in the larger context of the Act. As the First Circuit
once said, “[t]he immigration laws about adjustment of status are
183. Id. at 1072–73.
184. Id. at 1072. In Areguillin, the BIA found that “‘admission’ occurs when the
inspection officer communicates to the applicant that he has determined that the
applicant is not inadmissible, [and] [t]hat communication has taken place when
the inspector permits the applicant to pass through the port of entry.” Orozco, 521
F.3d at 1073; In re Areguillin, 17 I. & N. Dec. 308, 310 (B.I.A. 1980). See supra Part
II.C.3.a.i for more information on In re Areguillin.
185. Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1073.
186. Id. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) is the codified version of INA § 245(a).
187. Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1073.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1068. See supra Part V for a discussion about the current status of
the case and its current and potential impact on immigrants, the courts, and the
agency.
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not a haphazard compilation of provisions; [t]he terms and
provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) must be understood in the larger
191
context of the statutory scheme.”
Orozco’s argument that his inspection and authorization
constituted an “admission” within section 245(a) is consistent with
192
current case law and interpretations by the BIA and the courts.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis leads to unintended results
and overlooks the numerous provisions and safeguards already in
place that address the type of fraudulent behavior with which the
court was concerned.
A. The Court’s Interpretation of “Admission” is Overly Narrow
1.

The Term “Admitted” is Not so Clearly Defined in the Statute

As support for its conclusion that a non-citizen who obtains
entry by fraudulent means is not “admitted” within the meaning of
section 245(a), the Orozco court quoted a statement that it had
193
made in its decision in Shivaraman four years earlier: “8 U.S.C.
194
leaves no room for doubt,
section
1101(a)(13)(A)
unambiguously defining admission as the lawful entry of the alien
195
into the United States.”
It is true, as the court states, that the
definition of “admission” clearly and unambiguously says this;
however, what that definition means, particularly as it is applied to a
completely different provision of the INA within an entirely

191. See Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 26 (1st Cir. 2005).
192. See, e.g., In re Areguillin, 17 I. & N. Dec. 308, 310 n.6 (B.I.A. 1980) (stating
that an “’admission’ occurs when the inspecting officer communicates to the
applicant that he has determined that the applicant is not inadmissible. That
communication takes place when the inspector permits the applicant to pass
through a port of entry”); In re Orellana de Barden, No. A95-672-921, 2007 WL
4699871, at *1 (BIA Nov. 13, 2007) (stating that “In re Areguillin, supra, was not
superseded by the 1996 amendments to the Act.”); Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8,
14 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating that “ ‘[a]dmitted aliens’ means individuals who have
presented themselves for inspection by an immigration officer and who have been
allowed to enter the country.”); Emokah v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir.
2008) (finding that the petitioner, a citizen of Nigeria, was “admitted” to the
United States even though she was inadmissible at the time of her entry for fraud).
193. Shivaraman v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2004) (involving
the interpretation of “admitted” within the meaning of a different provision of the
Act, section 237(a)(2)(A)(i)). See infra Part IV.A.2.b.
194. INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006).
195. Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1072 n.3 (quoting Shivaraman, 360 F.3d at 1146). See
infra Part IV.A.2.b for a more detailed discussion of Shivaraman.
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different context, is another matter.
Despite the seemingly straightforward words in section
101(a)(13)(A), the meaning of the term “admission” is actually not
so clear. Indeed, the Orozco court stopped short of fully explaining
what the definition meant, saying instead that lawful entry requires
something “more than simply presenting oneself for inspection and
196
In actuality, the term
being allowed to enter the United States.”
“admission,” or some form thereof, is found in a myriad of sections
197
scattered throughout the INA.
In some instances, it is utilized
198
several times in different forms within the same provision. While
the Act mostly refers to “admission” in the sense of a non-citizen
coming to the United States and crossing over the border (or
entering at an airport), courts have also construed it to mean
something different: the attainment of legal status. The range of
contexts in which the term appears along with the occasional
variations as to its meaning reveals that a single, inflexible
definition of the term does not always make sense. Indeed, in
discussing “admission” in the context of INA section
237(a)(2)(A)(i), the same removal provision discussed in
Shivaraman, the Seventh Circuit has remarked that definitions
196. Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1072.
197. See, e.g., INA §§ 101(a)(4), (a)(6), (a)(13)(A)–(C), (a)(15)(L),
(a)(15)(O), (a)(20), (a)(27)(A), (a)(48)(i); 209(a)(1); 210(a)(1); 211(a);
212(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(2)(D)(iv), (a)(4)(A), (a)(4)(C)–(D), (a)(5)(A)(i),
(a)(5)(D), (a)(6)(A)–(C), (a)(6)(E)(ii), (a)(7)(A), (a)(7)(B), (a)(9)(A),
(a)(9)(B)(i), (g)(1), (h)–(l), (n)(1), (t)(1); 213; 214(a)(1), (b), (d), (e), (g)(7),
(n)(2)(C), (o); 216(b)(1); 216A(a)(1); 217(a)(1); 221(f)–(h); 222(g); 223(a),
(b); 233(a); 235(a)(1)–(5); 237(a)(1)(C)(i), (a)(1)(G)(i), (a)(1)(H),
(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii), (a)(2)(B)(i), (ii), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(E), (a)(4)(A); 240(a)(3),
(c)(2)(A), (c)(3), (e)(2)(A); 240A(a)(2), (b)(3), (c)(2); 240B(a)(1)(B)(i),
(a)(4); 240C; 241(c)(3)(B); 242(b)(4)(C); 245(a); 245A(a); 246(a), (b); 247(a);
248(a)(4); 249; 250; 272(a); 273(b); 274B(a)(3)(B); 276(a)(1); 287(d); 290(a);
291; 316(a); 317; 318; 319(a); 320(a)(3); 322(a)(5); 331(a); 334(b); 336(c);
337(a); 338; 344(d); 360(b), (c).
198. See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(2)(D)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1) (stating that the
“Attorney General may . . . waive the application of clause (i) . . . in the case of an
immigrant who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a United States citizen or of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established . . . that the
refusal of admission . . . of such an immigrant alien would . . . .”) (emphasis
added); INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) (stating “[a]ny alien
(other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who was
unlawfully present in the United States . . . and again seeks admission within 3 years
. . . is inadmissible.”) (emphasis added); INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (“[n]o
waiver shall be granted . . . in the case of an alien who has previously been admitted
. . . as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if either since the date of
such admission the alien has . . .”) (emphasis added).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/8

32

Shugall and Desnoyers: Orozco v. Mukasey: When an Entry May Not Be an "Admission"? and t

100

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1

rarely work universally since one word can have different
199
According to the court,
connotations in different constructions.
200
“[t]he whole point of contextual reading is that context matters.”
2. Numerous Interpretations of “Admission” are Found Within the
Larger Statutory Scheme
A look at case law in the larger scheme of the Act highlights
the important role that context sometimes plays in analyzing the
term “admission” and the occasional problems that courts have
experienced in trying to affix a single, inflexible definition to the
201
term.
a.

BIA Decisions

In 1998, in In re Ayala-Arevalo, the Board discussed several
terms, including “lawfully” and “admission,” in the context of INA
section 212(h), a provision that waives inadmissibility for certain
202
criminal activity. In so doing, the Board discussed “admission” in
the sense of attaining a legal status, and essentially concluded that
an admission for permanent residence within the meaning of
199. See Abdelqadar v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2005). In
Abdelqadar, the court discussed the term “admitted” within the context of INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i). The court noted that the context of the word “admission” in
that provision differed significantly from its context in the decision In re RosasRamirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616 (1999), see infra Part IV.A.2.a, in which the Board
construed “admission” to include an adjustment of status. Abdelqadar, 413 F.3d at
674.
200. Abdelqadar, 413 F.3d at 673.
201. See, e.g., Board Member Lory Diana Rosenberg concurrence and dissent
in In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616, 624 (stating that “Congress’
substitution of the term, ‘after admission’ for ‘after entry’ in [INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)] and in various other subsections of the Act, has created
semantic ambiguities that impair a rational interpretation of the statute and have
forced the Board to inappropriately guess at Congress’ intent”).
202. See In re Ayala-Arevalo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 398, 398 (B.I.A. 1998) (stating that
“[t]he only issue on appeal relates to the Immigration Judge’s finding that the
respondent was ineligible for a waiver under section 212(h) of the Act . . .”). INA
§ 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h):
“No waiver shall be granted . . . in the case of an alien who has previously
been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence if either since the date of such admission the alien has been
convicted of an aggravated felony or . . . has not lawfully resided
continuously in the United States for a period of not less than 7 years
immediately preceding the date of initiation of proceedings to remove
the alien from the United States.”
Id. (emphasis added).
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section 212(h) is “lawful” even if the person was admitted in
203
violation of the law. In Ayala-Arevalo, the respondent entered the
United States in January 1989, and then again on July 3, 1991, as a
204
lawful permanent resident.
About five years later, he was
205
The
convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States.
Immigration Judge found the respondent deportable for having
committed a crime involving moral turpitude and for being
206
excludable at the time of his last entry into the United States.
If available, a waiver granted under section 212(h) could have
potentially overcome the grounds under which the respondent was
207
found deportable. However, the waiver is unavailable to someone
who has “previously been admitted to the United States as an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence” unless the person has
lived in the United States for seven years before the start of
208
deportation or removal proceedings.
The respondent in AyalaArevalo was admitted as a permanent resident in July 1991, and his
deportation proceedings began about five years later, on May 20,
209
Thus, if the Board found that he was indeed “lawfully
1996.
admitted for permanent residence” within the meaning of section
212(h), he would not have the necessary seven years of residence
210
and would thus be ineligible for a waiver.
The respondent testified that he had engaged in fraudulent
activity before leaving the United States and continued this activity
211
upon his return in 1991.
Therefore, according to the
respondent, he was never “lawfully admitted” for permanent
residence because he was actually inadmissible at the time he was
212
admitted for permanent residence in 1991.
203. See In re Ayala-Arevalo, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 401, 403.
204. Id. at 399.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 398, 400. The Immigration Judge found the respondent deportable
under former “sections 241(a)(1)(A) and (2)(A)(i) of the . . . Act, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1251(a)(1)(A) and (2)(A)(i)(Supp. II 1996).” Id. at 398.
207. Former INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1996); In re Ayala-Arevalo, 22 I.
& N. Dec. at 403 (Rosenberg, dissenting) (“If available, a waiver granted under
section 212(h) of the Act could overcome several grounds of inadmissibility,
including . . . a conviction for . . . a single crime of moral turpitude.”).
208. Former INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1996).
209. In re Ayala-Arevalo, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 399–400.
210. Id. at 402 (citing former INA § 212(h) (Supp. II 1996), 18 U.S.C. 1182 (h)
(Supp. II 1996)).
211. Id. at 399.
212. Id. at 400. Lory Diana Rosenberg, Separate Opinion – The Cost of Admission:
Adjusting the Before and After of “Inspection and Authorization” Under § 101(a)(13)(A),
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213

The Board rejected this argument.
Notwithstanding the
word “lawful” in section 212(h), the Board stated that “the statute
does not . . . distinguish between those whose admission was lawful
and those who were [later found] to have been admitted in
214
violation of the law.” The Board concluded that the Immigration
Judge properly found the respondent ineligible for a 212(h)
215
waiver.
In her dissenting opinion in Ayala-Arevalo, Board Member
Rosenberg commented that although the majority’s approach “may
be a way to preclude the respondent’s application for a
discretionary waiver under section 212(h) of the Act . . . it strikes
216
me as result-oriented.” In short, the Ayala-Arevalo decision shows
how the BIA interpreted “admission” and how it seemed to stray
from a strict interpretation of the term “lawfully” as it applies to
admission for permanent residence in section 212(h).
Less than a year later, in April 1999, the Board looked at the
217
term “admission” in a different context. In In re Rosas-Ramirez the
respondent entered the United States without inspection, adjusted
her status to a lawful permanent resident under section 245(a), and
218
was later convicted of an aggravated felony. The issue before the
Board was whether someone in this situation has accomplished an
“admission” to the United States as that term is used in section
219
Under that provision, “[a]ny alien who is
237(a)(2)(A)(iii).
convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is
220
deportable.”
The Board was in somewhat of a predicament. An individual is
9-8 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3 (2004) (discussing respondent’s argument).
213. In re Ayala-Arevalo, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 401.
214. Id. The Board refused to separate the term “lawfully admitted” in the
statute from the phrase “previously been admitted,” because it found that the
latter phrase supplied the context for the former. Id. According to the Board, the
main issue in the case is whether the respondent “has previously been admitted”
for permanent residence to the United States. Id. at 402. “Inasmuch as the
respondent was admitted to the United States in lawful permanent resident status
[whether or not attained in violation of the law] and has failed to accrue 7 years of
lawful residence since the date of his admission, he is ineligible for a waiver under
section 212(h).” Id.
215. Id. at 403.
216. Id. at 406–07 (Rosenberg, dissenting).
217. See In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616 (B.I.A. 1999).
218. Id. at 616–17.
219. Id. at 617 (citing INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)
(Supp. II 1996)).
220. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
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removable under this section only if he or she was convicted after
221
As noted, the term “admission” is defined as a “lawful
admission.
entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and
222
authorization by an officer.”
The respondent in Rosas-Ramirez,
however, did not make a lawful entry into the United States; nor
was she inspected and authorized by an immigration officer to
223
enter the country at the border.
Yet, her later attainment of
lawful permanent resident status did not fall within the literal
language of the “admission” definition either because a person
does not make an “entry” upon adjusting his or her status, as the
224
person is already in the country.
However, a finding to the contrary—and in accord with the
respondent’s argument that her adjustment of status was not an
admission—would have an undesirable effect. Specifically, it would
allow non-citizens who originally entered the country without
inspection, subsequently adjusted status, and then committed a
crime, to avoid removal under the aggravated felony provision. At
the same time, non-citizens who entered lawfully under the same
circumstances could be found removable under the same statutory
section. According to the Seventh Circuit, “[t]he Board found that
225
too much to swallow.”
In resolving the case, the BIA noted that the definition of
“admission” in section 101(a)(13)(A) “does not set forth the sole
and exclusive means by which admission to the United States may
226
occur under the Act.”
The Board ultimately concluded that the
reference to “admission” in section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) includes both
those persons who are admitted at the time of entry under section
101(a)(13)(A) and those who are lawfully admitted for permanent
221. Id. (emphasis added).
222. INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added).
223. In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 616.
224. Griffith, supra note 97, at 986. In Rosas-Ramirez, the Board noted that
“[a]lthough adjustment to permanent resident status under section 245A requires
that an alien demonstrate admissibility as an immigrant, and is arguably the
equivalent of inspection and authorization by an immigration officer, it is less
clear that such a change in status can be characterized as an ‘entry’ into the
United States.” In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 617–18.
225. See Abdelqadar v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating
“why should illegal entrants enjoy rights superior to those of lawful immigrants?”).
226. In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 623 (emphasis added). Similarly,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service argued on appeal that the
Immigration Judge erred in finding that the term “admission,” as used in section
237(a)(2)(A)(iii), encompasses only the process described in section
101(a)(13)(A). Id. at 617.
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227

residence some time after entry.
Concluding that the
respondent’s adjustment of status was an “admission,” the Board
found that she was deportable for having been convicted of an
228
aggravated felony at any time after admission. Thus, in reaching
its conclusion, the Board construed the term “admission” to mean
something other than a “lawful entry” within the meaning of
229
section 101(a)(13)(A).
A similar question concerning the definition of “admission” in
the context of the same aggravated felony provision at issue in
230
Rosas-Ramirez arose in Ocampo-Duran v. Ashcroft.
Like the
respondent in Rosas-Ramirez, the petitioner in Ocampo-Duran
entered the country without inspection, adjusted his status, and was
231
later convicted of an aggravated felony.
Following its analysis in
Rosas-Ramirez, the Board similarly construed the petitioner’s
attainment of lawful permanent residence through adjustment of
status as an “admission” and therefore found him deportable under
232
The petitioner appealed the Board’s
section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).
233
decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

227. See id. at 623 (citing INA § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20)); INA §
101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (defining “lawfully admitted for permanent
residence”).
228. See In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 623–24 (citing INA §
237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)). Board Member Lory Diana
Rosenberg concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 624–31. Although
Member Rosenberg agreed that it is possible that Congress may have intended for
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) to apply to an individual who adjusted her status, like the
respondent, Rosenberg pointed out that there is nothing in the statute that says
so. Id. at 625. Several years later, in a 2005 decision, In re Shanu, the Board
clarified that its decision in Rosas-Ramirez was not a result-oriented approach,
stating, “the potential for unreasonable results was merely a fact marshaled to
support our interpretation of the aforementioned statutory language.” See In re
Shanu, 23 I. & N. Dec. 754, 758 (B.I.A. 2005), vacated, Aremu v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 450 F.3d 578 (4th Cir. 2006). According to the Board, “[i]t is that
language, and not the possibility of unreasonable results, that drove our analysis in
Rosas-Ramirez and continues to drive it today.” Id.
229. See Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 621–23; INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a)(13)(A).
230. See 254 F.3d 1133, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Prior history: On Petition for
Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. INS No. A90-781-434.”);
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is
convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”)
(emphasis added). See also Shivaraman, 360 F.3d 1132, 1145 (9th Cir. 2004)
(discussing Ocampo, Rosas-Ramirez, and INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)).
231. Ocampo-Duran, 254 F.3d at 1134.
232. See id. at 1134–35.
233. Id. at 1134.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

37

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 8

2008]

OROZCO v. MUKASEY

b.

105

Ninth Circuit decisions

In Ocampo-Duran, the court was tasked with determining
whether the Board correctly concluded that the petitioner’s
adjustment of status date constituted an “admission” under INA
section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), such that the petitioner could be
234
Like the respondent in
deportable for an aggravated felony.
Rosas-Ramirez, the petitioner in Ocampo-Duran argued that he was
not removable under that section because he entered the country
without inspection and was, thus, never technically “admitted” for
235
In dicta, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
purposes of the statute.
petitioner’s argument as an “overly-narrow interpretation of section
236
237(a)(2)(A)(iii).”
According to the court, the petitioner’s
adjustment of status was an “admission” because he had been
237
“lawfully admitted” as defined in section 101(a)(20).
The court
further found that the petitioner failed to explain “why Congress
would create a loophole in the removal laws for aliens who enter
the country without inspection, adjust their status, and then
238
Ultimately, however, the court
commit aggravated felonies.”
239
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Three years later, in Shivaraman v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit
further explained and defended its decision in Ocampo-Duran when
240
yet another “admission” question was raised. This time, however,
the facts were different and the relevant removal ground was
section 237(a)(2)(A)(i), which relates to removability for having
been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed
241
within five years after the date of admission.
In Shivaraman,
234. Id. at 1133. See also INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
235. Ocampo-Duran, 254 F.3d at 1134.
236. Id. at 1135.
237. See id. at 1134–35. INA section 101(a)(20), provides: “The term ‘lawfully
admitted for permanent residence’ means the status of having been lawfully
accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an
immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having
changed.”
238. Ocampo-Duran, 254 F.3d at 1135.
239. Id. (stating that “[b]ecause Ocampo-Duran is an alien who is removable
because of a conviction for an offense enumerated in INA § 242(a)(2)(C), we do
not have jurisdiction over his petition for review”). As a result, the court’s finding
in Ocampo-Duran is dicta and therefore not controlling.
240. Shivaraman v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2004).
241. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) states:
Any alien who—
(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five
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unlike the individuals in Rosas-Ramirez and Ocampo-Duran, the
petitioner entered the United States in valid nonimmigrant status,
242
later adjusted status, and subsequently committed a crime. Thus,
the court was not faced with the same “loophole” problem as in the
other cases. It did, however, face the task of having to determine
from which date the five-year period began to run: the date the
petitioner initially entered the United States in nonimmigrant
status following his inspection and authorization or the date he was
243
“admitted” as a lawful permanent resident.
“Having treated [the petitioner’s] adjustment in Rosas-Ramirez
as an ‘admission’ to the United States, the BIA wanted to maintain
244
an air of consistency in Shivaraman by taking the same approach.”
In its decision, the Board explained that the language of section
237(a)(2)(A)(i) (at issue in Shivaraman) is almost identical to the
language of section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) (at issue in Rosas-Ramirez and
Ocampo-Duran) and found no basis for distinguishing between the
245
Under its analysis, “any event that qualifies as an
two provisions.
‘admission’ under this definition can serve as the date of admission

years . . . after the date of admission, and
is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be
imposed, is deportable.
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
242. Shivaraman, 360 F.3d at 1143. More specifically, the petitioner in
Shivaraman entered the United States on an F-1 student visa on September 2, 1989.
Id. On January 1, 1997, he adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent
resident. Id. Petitioner was later convicted of first-degree theft “on the basis of
acts he committed between January 27, 1998, and October 10, 1998.” Id. In
March 2001, the INS served respondent with a Notice to Appear charging him
with removability under § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act for having been “convicted
of a crime, involving moral turpitude for which a sentence of one year or longer
may be imposed, that is committed ‘within five years . . . after the date of
admission’.” Id. The petitioner appeared before the Immigration Judge and filed a
motion to terminate his removal proceedings, arguing that his “date of admission”
for purposes of § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) was in 1989, when he first lawfully entered the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer, not his
later adjustment of status date. Id. at 1143–44. Relying primarily on Rosas-Ramirez,
the immigration judge found that the controlling “date of admission” was when
respondent’s adjustment of status was granted (not the date of his entry into the
United States). Id. at 1144. Accordingly, since the respondent committed his
crimes within five years of that date, the Immigration Judge found the petitioner
removable as charged, denied his request to terminate removal proceedings, and
ordered him removed to India. See id. at 1144–45. The BIA dismissed the appeal.
Id. at 1145.
243. Griffith, supra note 97, at 990.
244. Id. at 989.
245. Shivaraman, 360 F.3d at 1145.
(II)
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246

for the purposes of section 237(a)(2)(A)(i).”
On that basis, the
BIA found that the later date of respondent’s adjustment of status
247
was the proper date to start the running of the five-year period.
The Ninth Circuit gave no deference to the BIA’s conclusion,
noting that section 101(a)(13)(A) unambiguously defines the term
“admission” as the lawful entry into the United States after
248
inspection and admission.
It then pointed out that section
237(a)(2)(A)(i) says “the date of admission” and found that there
249
can only be one “the date.”
Considering the two statutory
sections as they related to one another, the court found that the
language of the statute was clear and that the “admission” date was
the date that the non-citizen effectuated a lawful entry into the
United States, and it is that date from which the five-year period
250
For the petitioner, that was the date when he
begins to run.
251
entered as a nonimmigrant in 1989.
The court wanted to avoid the subjective, malleable
252
construction of the admission date construed by the BIA.
Indeed, it criticized the BIA for “establishing a regime whereby an
IJ [Immigration Judge] may pick and choose . . . at his apparent
whim, among several dates of ‘admission’ for purposes of
253
determining removability under INA [section] 237(a)(2)(A)(i).”
The court also criticized the Board for relying on Rosas-Ramirez and
254
The Ninth Circuit did
Ocampo-Duran as support for its decision.
not find that those cases were wrongly decided; on the contrary, it
said that the Board and court had to embrace an alternative
construction of the term “admission” in those cases in order to
avoid the “absurd” results that would have followed with respect to

246. Id.
247. Id. at 1147.
248. Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13) (2006); Shivaramen, 360 F.3d at 1146. See also Aremu v. Dep’t of
Homeland Security, 450 F.3d 578, 579 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that the date of
adjustment of status does not constitute an “admission” for the purposes of INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i)); Zhang v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 313, 316 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding
that admission is based on actual physical, legal entry and not the attainment of a
designated legal status); Abdelqadar v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2005)
(referring to the term “admission” in aggravated felony deportation proceedings).
249. Shivaramen, 360 F.3d at 1148.
250. Id. at 1146.
251. Id. at 1144.
252. Id. at 1147; Griffith, supra note 96, at 991.
253. Shivaramen, 360 F.3d at 1147.
254. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/8

40

Shugall and Desnoyers: Orozco v. Mukasey: When an Entry May Not Be an "Admission"? and t

108

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1

255

non-citizens who enter the country unlawfully.
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit in Shivaraman further noted
that even though it did not apply the statutory definition of
“admission” in section 101(a)(13)(A) in Ocampo-Duran, its decision
in that case “both in its language and its logic, recognized section
101(a)(13)(A) as the primary, controlling definition of the
256
statutory term.”
The Ninth Circuit in Ocampo-Duran, however,
did not make any reference to section 101(a)(13)(A) in its
257
decision.
Regardless of whether the court had in fact previously
recognized section 101(a)(13)(A) as the primary, controlling
authority of the “admission” definition, the fact remains that the
court and Board departed from the plain words of the definition in
258
In fact, the Board went further
the aggravated felony context.
and stated on more than one occasion that section 101(a)(13)(A)
does not set forth the sole and exclusive means by which admission
259
Likewise, in Orozco, just because
to the United States may occur.
the Ninth Circuit applied one meaning to the term “admission” in
Shivaraman does not automatically mean that it must apply the
same meaning within the context of section 245(a), a completely
different provision of the INA.
B. The Interpretation of “Admission” Set Forth by the Petitioner in
Orozco is Consistent with Current Case Law and Secondary Sources
Although Orozco entered the United States using someone
255. See id. at 1148. The court also stated that Rosas-Ramirez and Ocampo-Duran
did not apply because in those cases, the individuals entered the U.S. without
inspection, whereas in Shivaraman, the petitioner entered the U.S. in
nonimmigrant status. Id. at 1147–48. Thus, the non-citizens in Rosas-Ramirez and
Ocampo-Duran only had one date of “admission” for purposes of determining
removability. Id. at 1148.
256. See id.
257. See Ocampo-Duran v. Ashcroft, 254 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (defining
“lawfully admitted” under section 101(a)(20) of the INA).
258. Shivaraman, 360 F.3d at 1148 (stating “[i]t [the Board] did so in light of
the various ‘absurd’ results that would have resulted with respect to aliens who first
entered the U.S. unlawfully if it failed to find a solution to the conundrum”).
259. In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616, 623 (B.I.A. 1999) (stating that
“section 101(a)(13)(A) . . . does not set forth the sole and exclusive means by
which admission to the United States may occur under the Act.”); In re Shanu, 23
I. & N. Dec. 754, 756–57 (stating again that “we have determined that section
101(a)(13)(A) does not provide an exhaustive definition of the term ‘admission,’”
and that “strict reliance on the ‘admission’ definition . . . could lead to peculiar
results in some cases”).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

41

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 8

2008]

OROZCO v. MUKASEY

109

else’s green card, he argued that he was nevertheless “admitted” for
purposes of section 245(a) because he presented himself for
inspection before an immigration officer and was allowed to
260
proceed into the United States. The Ninth Circuit characterized
Orozco’s argument as one relating to the location of his entry into
the United States, which the court found as only one step in the
261
admission process.
This characterization, however, misses a key
aspect of his argument. Orozco did not argue that his admission
was accomplished solely by appearing at a designated port-of-entry
262
for inspection.
Rather, he argued that an admission occurred
when he appeared at the port-of-entry for inspection and an
immigration officer allowed him to enter the United States
263
following inspection.
264
Orozco cited the published BIA decision Areguillin
as
265
support for the argument that he was admitted.
In order to
defeat Orozco’s argument, the Ninth Circuit found Areguillin to be
of no persuasive value in light of IIRIRA, which defined
266
“admission” to require a lawful entry into the United States.
Despite many opportunities post-IIRIRA, however, the BIA has
never overruled its decision in Areguillin. In fact, in one postIIRIRA unpublished decision, the BIA specifically stated that
Areguillin “was not superseded by the 1996 amendments to the
267
Additionally, many secondary sources continue to cite
Act.”
Areguillin (or its interpretation) as the standard for whether
someone has been “admitted” within the meaning of sections
268
245(a) and 101(a)(13)(A).
260. Orozco v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008).
261. Id. at 1072 (stating “Orozco argues that the ‘lawful entry’ requirement
imposed by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) relates to the location of the alien’s entry
into the United States”).
262. See Brief for Petitioner at 15, Orozco, 521 F.3d 1068 (No. 06-75021).
263. See id. (stating that it “has not been contested or challenged by the Service
[government] . . . [that] upon inspection by said officer, Orozco was authorized to
enter the U.S.”).
264. 17 I. & N. Dec. 308 (B.I.A. 1980).
265. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Orozco, 521 F.3d 1068 (No. 06-75021).
266. Orozco, 521 F.3d 1068, at 1073.
267. In re Orellana de Barden, No. A95-672-921, 2007 WL 4699871, at *1
(B.I.A. Nov. 13, 2007).
268. See, e.g., 15-1 EXAMINATIONS HANDBOOK SCOPE (2008) (citing In re
Areguillin under “Precedent Decisions” heading); 4 GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, §
51.03[2] (discussing eligibility under section 245(a) and stating that “the
admission itself need not have been regular or lawful, or even as a
nonimmigrant”).
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In re Areguillin and Post-IIRIRA BIA Decisions

In In re Areguillin, the respondent, a citizen of Mexico,
appealed a decision of the Immigration Judge denying her
application for adjustment of status under section 245(a) because
she was not “inspected and admitted” into the United States as the
269
In her hearing before the judge, respondent
statute required.
testified that she crossed the “border in a car with two couples and
270
another woman.”
She had no travel or entry documents in her
271
According to respondent, at the port-ofpossession at the time.
entry, an immigration officer looked inside the car, asked the
driver a question, and then permitted the car and its occupants to
272
proceed into the United States.
The Immigration Judge
concluded that the respondent was not inspected and admitted for
purposes of section 245 because she was in fact inadmissible for
273
entering the country without proper documentation.
Sustaining respondent’s appeal, the BIA stated that it could
find no basis for the Immigration Judge’s construction of the term
“admission,” that only a non-citizen who has been “lawfully or
legally” admitted to the United States may qualify for adjustment of
274
status.
According to the Board, this interpretation is contrary to
the legislature’s action of eliminating the restrictive 1952 Act
requirement that only bona fide nonimmigrants may adjust status
275
An “admission,” the Board said, occurs
in the United States.
when the inspecting officer communicates to the applicant that he
has determined that the applicant is not inadmissible, and that
communication takes place when the inspector permits the
276
The Board further
applicant to pass through the port-of-entry.
stated that the rule that a non-citizen has not entered without
inspection when he presented himself for inspection and made no
277
knowing false claim to U.S. citizenship applies in determining
269. In re Areguillin, 17 I. & N. Dec. 308 (B.I.A. 1980).
270. Id. at 309.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 310.
275. See id. at 310 n.5.
276. Id. at 310 n.6 (citing In re V—Q—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 78 (B.I.A. 1960)).
277. Id. at 310. The BIA treats individuals who made a false claim to United
States differently because an immigration officer is not empowered to inspect a
citizen in the same manner as a non-citizen. 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 48,
§ 71.04[3][c][iii]. As such, non-citizens who entered the United States pursuant a
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whether an alien has satisfied the inspection and admission
278
requirement.
Since the Immigration Judge failed to make a finding about
Areguillin’s credibility as to her means of entering the country, the
279
According to
BIA remanded the case for further proceedings.
the Board, if the respondent’s account about her entry is indeed
true, she was “inspected and admitted” within the meaning of
section 245(a) despite the fact that she entered the country without
280
any valid entry documents.
In reaching its decision, the Board cited several other Board
decisions that looked at a non-citizen’s entry and inspection into
281
the United States.
All of these cases, however, predate the
false claim of United States citizenship are deemed to have avoided the inspection
process. Reid v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 492 F.2d 251, 255 (1974)
(citing CHARLES GORDON & HENRY ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE §
3.16b (1972) (stating that in contrast to the “detained screening process
developed for determination of the admissibility of immigrants, the returning
United States citizen needs only furnish evidence of his citizenship, usually in the
form of a passport . . . . [F]or obvious reasons the examination of re-entering
citizens must of necessity be limited as compared with the detained inspection of
aliens seeking entry.”)). In In re S—, a German citizen entered the country
claiming to have been born in the United States. In re S—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 599, 599
(1962). The Board found that he was ineligible for adjustment of status because
he was never “inspected and admitted.” Id. According to the Board, inspection
means that the non-citizen presents himself before a proper official for an
inspection as an alien. Id. at 601. Since the respondent claimed United States
citizenship, the officer did not have an opportunity to check his right to enter the
country as an alien. Id. Thus, he in effect evaded the inspection process
altogether. See id. at 599. See also In re Wong, 12 I. & N. Dec. 733, 734 n.1 (B.I.A.
1968) (citing Goon Mee Heung v. INS, 380 F.2d 236 (1st Cir. 1967)); In re Woo, 11
I. & N. Dec. 706 (B.I.A. 1966).
278. In re Areguillin, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 310–11.
279. Id. at 310.
280. See id.
281. See, e.g., In re Loo Bing Sun, 15 I. & N. Dec. 307, 308–09 (B.I.A. 1975)
(observing that the non-citizen was “inspected and admitted” under section
245(a), of the Act on his last entry into the United States even though that entry
was based on his lawful permanent resident status that he had obtained through
fraud); In re V— Q—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 78, 79–80 (B.I.A. 1960) (stating that “
‘admission’ occurs when an authorized employee of the Service communicates in
a tangible manner to an applicant for admission his determination that the
applicant has established that he is not inadmissible under the immigration laws.
At the point such communication is made and received by the applicant,
‘admission’ has occurred.”); In re G—, 3 I. & N. Dec. 136, 136 (B.I.A. 1948)
(reaffirming its prior holdings that a non-citizen who physically presents himself
for questioning is ‘inspected’ even though he volunteers no information and is
asked no questions by the immigration authorities); In re F—, 1 I. & N. Dec. 343,
349 (B.I.A. 1942) (concluding that the non-citizen did not enter the United States
without inspection due to false or misleading statements where the officer did not
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passage of IIRIRA, which amended INA section 101(a)(13) to its
current definition, requiring a “lawful” entry into the United
282
States.
The question then becomes whether the Board’s
interpretation of “admission” in Areguillin remains good law after
IIRIRA. The Ninth Circuit did not think so.
A look at post-IIRIRA case law, however, shows that the BIA
has never overruled Areguillin in a published decision. In fact, the
Board has not issued any published decisions after IIRIRA
specifically analyzing the terms “inspected” and “admitted” within
the meaning of 245(a). The Board has, however, issued several
unpublished decisions that shed light on its view of the continuing
validity of Areguillin.
In 2004, in In re Parra-Parra, the Board looked at whether the
respondent who had left the country during the pendency of his
adjustment of status application was “inspected and admitted”
upon his return to the country even though he failed to have his
283
advance parole form stamped by the immigration official and,
thus, was deemed to have abandoned his adjustment application
284
after his departure from the United States.
This meant that the
respondent technically had no valid basis for returning to the
United States when he presented himself for inspection. The
respondent stated that he did not have the advance parole form
stamped because the immigration officer did not ask him any
285
questions. Citing Areguillin, the Board found that the respondent
“was, in fact, inspected and admitted when he was allowed to enter

ask him relevant information about his admission. The non-citizen is not required
to volunteer information); In re F—, 1 I. & N. Dec. 90, 91 (B.I.A. 1941) (finding
that, contrary to the government’s contentions, the non-citizen did not enter the
United States without inspection because he physically presented himself for
questioning and the officer chose not to ask him any questions).
282. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009; see cases cited supra note 281.
283. “Advance parole” is often granted to non-citizens residing in the United
States who have a need to travel abroad, but whose immigration status would not
afford them a right to legal admission upon their return. Ibragimov v. Gonzales,
476 F.3d 125, 132 (2nd Cir. 2007). The government decides in advance of a noncitizen’s arrival that he or she will be paroled into the United States upon arriving
at a port-of-entry. Id.; Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 15 n.7 (1st Cir. 2005).
Advance parole is not explicitly contemplated by the statute governing parole, but
is permitted by 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(f). Ibragimov, 476 F.3d at 132. See also 8 C.F.R.
§ 212.5(f) (stating that “[w]hen parole is authorized for an alien who will travel to
the United States without a visa, the alien shall be issued form I-512”).
284. In re Parra-Parra, A77 751 684, 2004 WL 2418593 (B.I.A. Oct. 5, 2004).
285. Id.
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the United States by an immigration inspector.”
In two later decisions, in 2006 and 2007, the Board declined to
reach the question of whether the IIRIRA amendments to section
287
101(a)(13) overruled Areguillin.
In another 2007 unpublished
case, the Board distinguished Areguillin and attempted to limit the
scope of the decision by noting that the respondent there was
288
considered “on those facts” to have been inspected and admitted.
Later that same year, however, the Board expressly said that “[In re]
Areguillin . . . was not superseded by the 1996 amendments to the
289
Act.”
In that case, the respondent testified that she presented
herself with others in a car for inspection at a port-of-entry and was
290
allowed to proceed into the United States.
According to the
Board, the respondent sufficiently established that she was
291
inspected and admitted, and eligible to adjust her status.
Just recently, in May 2008, the Board found that no admission
was established where the respondent was asleep in the back of a
car and was waived through the border without ever speaking to
the immigration officer or knowing the details of what happened at
292
Citing Orozco v. Mukasey, the Board found that
the checkpoint.
293
Areguillin was not controlling “in the current case.” According to
the Board, the respondent had no documentation to prove his
claim that he entered the United States in March 2002, and thus
could not meet his burden of proving that “he made a lawful entry
294
or admission into the United States.” Although the Immigration
Judge in Osovskiy concluded that Areguillin was statutorily overruled

286. Id.
The Board nevertheless found the respondent ineligible for
adjustment of status for being inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)
because of a subsequent unlawful entry into the United States. Id. (citing INA
§ 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) (2006)).
287. See In re Raza, A95 156 705, 2006 WL 2803312 (B.I.A. July 28, 2006)
(declining to address whether the standard for “inspection and admission”
articulated in Areguillin is applicable here). See also In re Arreola-Amezquita, A95
489 549, 2007 WL 275728 (B.I.A. Jan. 11, 2007) (stating “[w]e need not reach the
question whether the amended section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act, defining the
term ‘admission,’ overruled In re Areguillin”).
288. In re Alimi, A44 440 041, 2007 WL 2588557 (B.I.A. Aug. 21, 2007).
289. In re Orellana de Barden, A95 672 921, 2007 WL 4699871 (B.I.A. Nov. 13,
2007).
290. Id. See In re Areguillin, 17 I. & N. Dec. 308, 308 (B.I.A. 1980).
291. In re Orellana de Barden, 2007 WL 4699871 (B.I.A. 2007).
292. In re Osovskiy, No. A97698552, 2008 WL 2401108 (B.I.A. May 7, 2008).
293. Id.
294. See id. Interestingly, the Board in In re Osovskiy used the terms “lawful
entry” and “admission” in the disjunctive.
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by IIRIRA, the Board failed to discuss the continuing validity of
Areguillin in its analysis; nor did it go so far as to conclude that
295
Areguillin was no longer good law.
Additionally, in her concurring and dissenting opinion in
Rosas-Ramirez, former Board Member Rosenberg discussed the term
“admitted” in section 101(a)(13)(A) consistently with the Areguillin
296
standard.
According to Rosenberg, “the new terms ‘admission’
and ‘admitted’ require that the entry must be lawful. That is, the
individual must be inspected by an immigration official at a port-of297
entry and authorized to enter the country.”
Finally, in two unpublished post-IIRIRA decisions, the Board
recognized the non-citizens’ eligibility to adjust their status under
section 245(a) with a 212(i) waiver notwithstanding the fact that
the individuals gained entry into the United States by fraudulent
298
means.
2.

Circuit Court Decisions

Aside from Orozco, a search of federal circuit court cases has
not revealed any published decisions in which the meaning of
“admission” for purposes of section 245(a) was the principal issue
where fraud was involved. This is likely due to the fact that
appellate courts do not have jurisdiction over discretionary denials
of applications for relief in removal proceedings, including
299
Therefore, the issue has not
adjustment of status applications.
had the opportunity to present itself to the circuit courts. Courts
may, however, still review constitutional claims and questions of

295. See id.
296. See In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616, 626 (1999); cf. In re
Areguillin, 17 I. & N. Dec. 308, 311 (B.I.A. 1980).
297. In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 626 (citing INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(13)(A) (2006)).
298. See In re Martin, No. A29714117, 2008 WL 4335829 (B.I.A. Sept. 2, 2008)
(remanding proceedings to afford non-citizen the opportunity to seek adjustment
of status in conjunction with a waiver even though the non-citizen had entered the
United States using a fraudulent passport). See also In re Krakhmalov, No.
A40418326, 2004 WL 880323 (B.I.A. Mar. 3, 2004) (declining to disturb the
Immigration Judge’s decision to grant the non-citizen’s application for adjustment
of status and waiver under INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), even though the
respondent had committed marriage fraud in order to initially enter the United
States).
299. See INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i) 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (stating that
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law . . . no court shall have jurisdiction
to review any judgment regarding the granting of relief under (section 1255). . .”).
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law, which include determining, as a matter of law, a non-citizen’s
300
statutory eligibility for adjustment of status under section 245(a).
While the meaning of “admitted” under section 245(a) may
not have been a central issue, several circuit court decisions have
nevertheless discussed or conveyed their interpretations of the
term in various post-IIRIRA decisions. An example is Succar v.
Ashcroft in which the First Circuit cited section 1101(a)(13)(A) and
stated that “‘[a]dmitted aliens’ means individuals who have
presented themselves for inspection by an immigration officer and
301
who have been allowed to enter the country.” The court did not
distinguish between non-citizens who entered the country with
proper travel documents and those who did not.
Along the same lines, the Second Circuit found that the
petitioner, a citizen of Nigeria, was “admitted” to the United States
even though she was inadmissible at the time of her entry for
302
fraud.
There, the petitioner entered the United States on a
tourist visa that she had obtained by falsely using a surname of a
wealthy local businessman, with whom she was romantically
involved, after a prior application in her own surname had been
303
rejected. The court expressly disagreed with the contention that
the petitioner’s fraud must necessarily mean that she entered the
304
United States without admission. On the contrary, the court said
that while the manner in which petitioner procured admission
rendered her inadmissible, that “does not change the fact that she
305
was, indeed, admitted.”
Still other decisions reflect the courts’ interpretations of the
term “admitted,” in a more indirect way, in that several decisions
have found that non-citizens who had gained entry by fraud or

300. See INA § 242(a)(2)(D)) (stating “[n]othing in subparagraph (B) or (C) .
. . which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding
review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review
filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section”). See
also Orozco v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating “we retain
jurisdiction to decide, as a matter of law, whether an alien is statutorily eligible for
adjustment of status”) (internal quotations omitted).
301. Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2005). The Succar court
considered the validity of a regulation promulgated by the Attorney General, 8
C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) in the context of adjustment of status under section 245(a).
Id. at 9.
302. Emokah v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2008).
303. Id. at 114.
304. Id. at 118.
305. Id.
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misrepresentation were ineligible for adjustment of status on the
basis of either discretion or inadmissibility, but not for lack of an
306
admission.
3.

Secondary Sources

Despite the lack of federal circuit court case law specifically on
point with the issue in Orozco, many secondary sources continue to
cite Areguillin (or its interpretation) as the standard for whether
someone has been “admitted” within the meaning of sections
245(a) and 101(a)(13)(A). For example, under the heading
“Precedent Decisions” the INS Examinations Handbook cites
Areguillin and states its proposition as follows: “[p]hysically
presenting oneself for questioning and making no knowing false
claim to U.S. citizenship constitutes being ‘inspected and admitted’
307
for section 245 purposes.” According to another 2008 source, in
order to be “admitted,” non-citizens must present themselves to an
immigration officer at the border, who questions them about their
308
basis for entering the United States and approves that entry.”
306. See, e.g., Falae v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2005) (assuming that
petitioner showed prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status notwithstanding
the fact that he had entered the United States with a passport belonging to
someone else); Balbuena v. United States Attorney General, 277 Fed. App’x. 136 at
139 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting in dicta that it appears that petitioner, who entered
the United States without a valid entry document, is ineligible for adjustment of
status due to his inadmissibility for fraud relating to his marriage to a United States
citizen) [i.e., not statutory ineligibility due to his lack of admission]; Pjetrushi v.
Ashcroft, 108 Fed. App'x. 65, 68 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that petitioners’
ineligibility for adjustment of status is due to their inadmissibility for having
fraudulently entered the United States using passports that were not their own)
[i.e., not statutory ineligibility due to his lack of admission].
307. 15 CHARLES GORDON, ET AL., 1 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
L. & PROC. IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERVICE EXAMINATIONS HANDBOOK Part III at
287 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed., 2008). See also 16 CHARLES GORDON, ET AL.,
OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
245.3b (Matthew Bender, rev. ed., 2008) (instructing immigration officers
conducting interviews in connection with adjustment application under § 245(a)
to deny an application if the person’s nonimmigrant visa was obtained by fraud or
misrepresentation, unless the applicant qualifies for a waiver under § 212(i),
insinuating applicant is statutorily eligible to adjust status with a waiver).
308. AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
§ 20:5 (Sept. 2008). See also RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 7:2
(2d ed. 2008) (stating that “[o]ne of the affirmative requirements for adjustment
of status is that the person entered the United States lawfully, not evading
inspection. Therefore, it must be shown that the person was inspected by an
Immigration Officer and admitted into the United States in nonimmigrant status,
or inspected and paroled into the United States. A person who entered the United
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Still another source states “any person not refused entry, or placed
in deferred inspection or removal proceedings, is considered to
309
have been inspected and admitted.”
Along the same lines, in
discussing eligibility for section 245(a), one treatise expressly states
that “[t]he admission itself need not have been regular or lawful, or
310
even as a nonimmigrant.” The treatise also provides that even an
“entry on a document falsely procured counts as admission if the
holder was inspected and admitted as an alien[,]” rendering the
individual (if otherwise statutorily eligible and deserving as a matter
311
of discretion) eligible to adjust status to a permanent resident.
States without inspection is not eligible to apply for permanent resident status.
This would include persons who illegally entered through a land border other
than a border crossing post, stowaways, and persons who entered the United States
claiming to be United States citizens, or NATO personnel who are not
inspected.”) (emphasis added).
309. Sarah Ignatius & Elisabeth S. Stickney, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF NAT’L
LAWS. GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW & FAMILY § 8:19 (2008). Note, however, that, citing
In re Robles, authors Ignatius and Stickney further state that “[a] person who
intentionally evades DHS inspection when entering the United States has not been
inspected and admitted.” Id. (citing In re Robles, 15 I. & N. Dec. 734 (B.I.A.
1976)). In Robles, the Board found that the non-citizen entered the country
without inspection where he was told by an immigration officer at a port-of-entry
to stay and wait in the inspection area. In re Robles, 15 I. & N. Dec. 734, Interim
Decision 2514, (B.I.A. Aug. 9, 1976). Instead of waiting, the non-citizen fled and
entered the United States. Id. at 735.
310. 4 GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, § 51.03[2] n.2 (stating that “[t]he need to
be admitted as a bona fide nonimmigrant was eliminated by the 1960
amendments[,]” but that “[a] bad faith entry may however affect eligibility on
other grounds”). See also id. § 51.01 (stating that “[t]he test [of section 245
eligibility] is also met by the alien who is admitted, regardless of whether the
admission is proper”) (emphasis added). See also NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF NAT’L
LAWS. GUILD, 1 IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE § 8:9 (3d ed. 2008) (stating “the
Operations Instructions of INS specify that it is not necessary for the applicant to
have entered as a bona fide nonimmigrant, although the manner of entry may be
considered in a discretionary denial of relief”).
311. 4 GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, § 51.03[2] (citing In re Ghazal, 10 I. & N.
Dec. 344 (B.I.A. 1963); In re Loo Bing Sun, 15 I. & N. Dec. 307, 308 (B.I.A. 1975);
In re K—B—N—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 50, 52 (Ass’t Comm’r 1960)). See also 6 GORDON ET
AL., supra note 48, § 71.04[3][c][iii] (stating “[m]anifestly, not every falsification
and misstatement inhibits inspection. Thus, if a person presented himself or
herself to an immigration officer as an alien, but made a misrepresentation that
might have affected his or her entry, inspection may still have occurred.”). See also
AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., 1 IMMIGR. LAW & BUSINESS § 3:86. Statutory
Requirements (July 2006) (stating that “[i]n order to be eligible for adjustment of
status the alien must, as a first requirement, have been inspected, admitted, or
paroled into the United States. Aliens who entered the United States illegally,
without inspection or as stowaways, are not eligible to adjust status.”). This seems
to insinuate that an entry that was made with inspection and not as a stowaway is
legal and qualifies the individual for adjustment of status. Id.
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Several other sources provide a meaning of “admission” under
101(a)(13)(a) in the general context of non-citizens seeking entry
312
into the United States at a port-of-entry or border.
All of the
sources cite Areguillin as authority for the standard for determining
313
a non-citizen’s “admission” into the United States.
Thus, in light of the unclear definition of “admission,” the
different constructions of the term in the larger statutory scheme,
the published Board decision providing an interpretation of the
term specifically pertaining to the provision at issue in Orozco, and
interpretations by the circuit courts and secondary sources that
either continue to cite Areguillin or interpret the term consistent
with that in the decision, it appears as if the Ninth Circuit in Orozco
314
incorrectly found that Areguillin was of no persuasive value.
Consequently, the court should have reversed the Board’s decision
finding Orozco statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status and
remanded the case in order to allow Orozco to apply for
adjustment of status in conjunction with a waiver under INA
section 212(i). Alternatively, the court should have, at the very
least, remanded the case to the agency with instructions to explain
its departure from its published decision in Areguillin and the
numerous unpublished decisions that have followed the same
analysis.
4. The Court Should Have Remanded the Case to the Agency Instead
of Deciding the Case
In an unpublished decision, the Board adopted and affirmed
the decision of the Immigration Judge finding Orozco statutorily
ineligible for adjustment of status notwithstanding his eligibility for
315
a waiver.
In so doing, a single member of the Board departed
312. See, e.g., ANNA MARIE GALLAGHER, 1 IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE 2d § 2:27
(2008) (defining admission as occurring “when the inspecting officer
communicates to the alien applicant” that “applicant is not inadmissible, and such
communication has taken place when the inspector permits the applicant to pass
through the port of entry”); Dag Ytreberg, 3 C.J.S. Aliens § 631 (2008); Laura
Hunter Dietz et al., 3B AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 1311 (2008).
313. In re Areguillin, 17 I. & N. Dec. 308, 310 n.6 (B.I.A. 1980) (citing In re V—
Q—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 78, 79 (B.I.A.1960)) (defining “admission” as, or similar to,
occurring when the inspecting officer communicates to the non-citizen at a portof-entry that the officer has determined that he or she is not inadmissible, and
such communication takes place when the inspector permits the non-citizen to
pass through the port-of-entry).
314. See Orozco v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008).
315. Id. at 1070.
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from the agency’s own standard that had been in place for over
316
twenty-five years. Virtually no explanation was given as to why an
“admission” for purposes of section 245(a) now suddenly requires
something more than the standard it had articulated earlier in
317
Indeed, only six months before the Orozco decision,
Areguillin.
the Board expressly said that “Areguillin . . . was not superseded by
318
the 1996 amendments to the Act.”
The Ninth Circuit has previously acknowledged that “[w]hile
agencies must have significant flexibility to adapt their practices to
meet changed circumstances or the facts of a particular case,” they
may not simply disregard their own established standards and
319
policies without giving a reason for doing so.
Here, the agency
simply adopted and affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision
without an adequate explanation of its departure from precedent
and its long-standing practice of finding that an individual in
Orozco’s situation was admitted.
In fact, the Immigration Judge erred in the first instance by
not following the precedent decision of the Board in Areguillin,
320
Regardless, the agency
which is required by agency regulations.
should have the first opportunity to interpret the meaning of
“admitted” under the current statutory framework before a
321
precedent decision is set by the reviewing court.
316. In re Areguillin was decided in 1980. In re Areguillin, 17 I. & N. Dec. 308
(B.I.A. 1980).
317. The Ninth Circuit decision simply states that the Board cited In re
Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (B.I.A. 1994), “agree[ing] with the Immigration
Judge that Orozco is ineligible for adjustment of status . . . because he did not
establish lawful entry and admission pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)”
(internal quotations omitted). Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1070.
318. In Re Orellana de Barden, No. A95 672 921, 2007 WL 4699871, at *1
(B.I.A. Nov. 13, 2007).
319. Yepes-Prado v. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Braun v.
I.N.S., 992 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1993); Israel v. I.N.S., 785 F.2d 738, 740 (9th
Cir. 1986).
320. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2008) (“decisions of the Board . . . shall be binding
on all officers and employees of the Department of Homeland Security or
immigration judges in the administration of the immigration laws of the United
States”).
321. See I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (holding that a court
of appeals, except in rare circumstances, should remand a case to an agency for
decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands). See also Zheng
v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 176, 184 (2nd Cir. 2008) (stating that remand is appropriate
in the following circumstances: (1) insufficient attention by the IJ and the BIA to
the questions identified; (2) the desirability of national uniformity given the grave
consequences of a frivolousness finding; (3) the ambiguity of the statute and
corresponding regulations; (4) the dearth of law in this circuit related to these
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Since the agency did not give the issue the attention that it
requires, the Ninth Circuit should have remanded the case to the
BIA for a better explanation about its departure from existing
precedent before rendering a decision on the case.
C.The Court’s Analysis Produces Unintended and Unjust Results
The error of the court’s conclusion that someone in Orozco’s
situation is not “admitted” into the United States can be seen by
looking at some of its logical implications within the larger
statutory scheme.
The court’s conclusion renders several
provisions of the Act inapplicable or meaningless, beginning with
the removal provision under which the government charged
322
Orozco: section 237(a)(1)(A).
According to that provision, only non-citizens “in and admitted
to the United States” may be found deportable for being
323
However, under the Ninth
inadmissible at the time of entry.
Circuit’s analysis, Orozco was never technically “admitted” because
he could not satisfy the “lawful entry” requirement under section
324
Thus, in effect, the Ninth Circuit determined
101(a)(13)(A).
that Orozco was admitted for removability purposes, but not
325
admitted for purposes of adjustment of status. This inconsistency
contradicts the court’s emphasis on the need for a consistent
interpretation of the meaning of section 101(a)(13)(A) and its
statement that a singular definition applies to all of the references
questions; (5) the high volume of cases that this issue implicates; and (6) the
severe impact of a frivolousness finding on an alien's immigration prospects); AILF
PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 77.
322. Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1070 (stating that “[t]he government subsequently
filed an amended charge of removability against Orozco, pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(A), charging him with presenting a counterfeit document to gain
admission to the United States”).
323. INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006) (emphasis added), which
provides:
Any alien . . . in and admitted to the United States shall, upon the order
of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within one or more of
the following classes of deportable aliens: . . . (A) Inadmissible aliens.
Any alien who at the time of entry or adjustment of status was within one
or more of the classes of aliens inadmissible by the law existing at such
time is deportable.
INA § 237(a)(1)(A).
324. Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1072–73.
325. See Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that
“we are not persuaded that x may become not-x because the process has
progressed to step two”). See also AILF PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 77.
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326

to “admission” in the Act.
Similarly, the court’s conclusion that someone who entered
the country by fraud is not “admitted” also renders the waiver at
section 237(a)(1)(H) meaningless. Under that provision, the
removal of a non-citizen under section 237(a)(1)(A) (for having
been inadmissible at the time of “admission” for fraud or
misrepresentation under section 212(a)(6)(C)) may be waived,
327
Notably, the
assuming all other statutory requirements are met.
statute does not apply to individuals who are inadmissible under any
other category at the time of admission; it only applies to
inadmissibility at the time of entry under sections 237(a)(1)(A)
and 212(a)(6)(C) where there was a misrepresentation at the time
328
of admission.
Under the court’s analysis in Orozco, however,
someone who was inadmissible at the time of admission as a result
of fraud can no longer seek a waiver under 237(a)(1)(H) because,
329
technically, no “admission” ever took place.
It is a fundamental cannon of statutory construction that
courts should not interpret one provision of a statute in a way that
330
renders another part of the same statute superfluous.
It is
presumed that Congress was aware of section 237(a)(1)(H) when it
passed IIRIRA in 1996 and it likely did not intend for the definition
of section 101(a)(13)(A) to render that section of the Act
326. Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1071–72 (stating that “[t]he definitions found in 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) apply to terms ‘used in [the] chapter’ containing 8
U.S.C. § 1255(a). See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a).”).
327. INA § 237(a)(1)(H), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H). See supra Part II.D for
more information about section 237(a)(1)(H).
328. INA § 237(a)(1)(H), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H); In re Guang Li Fu, 23 I. &
N. Dec. 985, 988 (B.I.A. 2006) (concluding that “section 237(a)(1)(H) of the Act
is best interpreted as authorizing a waiver of removability under section
237(a)(1)(A) based on charges of inadmissibility at the time of entry under
section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, as well as under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i),
where there was a misrepresentation made at the time of admission”).
329. See Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1071–72.
330. United States v. Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.3d 1042, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007)
(citing United States v. Fish, 368 F.3d 1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 2004)); Schneider v.
Chertoff, 450 F.3d 944, 954 (9th Cir. 2006) ("We strive to avoid constructions that
render words meaningless.") (quoting United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379
F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2004); Williamson v. C.I.R., 974 F.2d 1525, 1531 (9th Cir.
1992) ("We are not at liberty to impose upon a statute a construction that renders
parts of its language nugatory."). See also Ansari v. Qwest Commc’ns Corp., 414
F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[i]t is a cardinal principle of statutory
construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can
be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant”) (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)); In re
Artigas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 99, 100–01 (B.I.A. 2001).
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331

meaningless.
Also, under the Orozco analysis, even people who did not
engage in intentionally fraudulent activity, but whose entries were
somehow invalid, may be forever barred from adjusting status
332
For example, assume that a young man
under section 245(a).
was granted a second preference category immigrant visa petition
as the unmarried son of a lawful permanent resident while he was
still unmarried. Then, after the man was granted the immigrant
visa but before he entered the United States as a lawful permanent
resident, the man marries, believing that such a marriage would
have no effect on his status. The man then enters the United States
without disclosing his marriage, as he thinks it is irrelevant and is
not asked about his marital status. Even if the young man is later
found to have been inadmissible at the time of entry for not having
had a valid immigrant visa, he historically could have been eligible
for adjustment of status with a waiver under INA section
237(a)(1)(H). Now, however, that individual is statutorily barred
from adjusting, despite an innocent misrepresentation (or failure
333
to disclose information).
Finally, the court’s analysis in Orozco leads to a peculiar
discrepancy. Under its analysis, individuals who misrepresented
material facts on their adjustment of status applications or lied to
an immigration officer about a material fact in an adjustment
interview may still adjust their status if they obtain a 212(i) waiver
334
and are otherwise eligible to adjust.
An individual like Orozco,
however, who committed fraud upon entry, is forever barred as a
335
matter of law.
One of Congress’s many amendments to section 245(a) was to
remove the overly restrictive requirement of allowing only bona
fide nonimmigrants to adjust their status to lawful permanent
336
337
residents.
Aside from a few limited exceptions, the Orozco
court’s overly-narrow interpretation of “admitted” takes us several
steps back to a point where non-citizens who are otherwise eligible
331. Doe v. Kamehameha Sch., 470 F.3d 827, 847 (9th Cir. 2006) ("we assume
that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation") (quoting Miles v.
Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990)).
332. See INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a).
333. Id.
334. See Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1071–73.
335. See id.
336. Joint Resolution of July 14, 1960. See also supra Part II.B.1.
337. See, e.g., INA §§ 245(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) and 212(k), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(k).
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to adjust status must, once again, leave their families and go abroad
338
This seems contrary to Congressional
to secure immigrant visas.
intent, as the waiver under INA section 212(i) was created to
forgive certain misrepresentations and promote family unity (as was
339
Moreover, requiring such
INA section 237(a)(1)(H)).
individuals to travel abroad in order to secure immigrant visas
creates a whole host of additional problems for the intending
immigrant, as set forth in Part V(B) below.
Furthermore, had the court determined that a 212(i) waiver
was available to Orozco and others in his situation, it could have
determined that it had the authority to apply the waiver nunc pro
tunc to Orozco’s entry. Had it done so, it would have then
remanded the case to the agency to adjudicate the 212(i) waiver. If
the 212(i) waiver were then granted nunc pro tunc, Orozco would
have unquestionably made a lawful admission, would be admissible,
and could be granted adjustment of status.
D. The Court’s Concerns Over “Absurd Results” Are Already Addressed by
the Statute
The Ninth Circuit cited two criminal fraud statutes in support
of its finding that Orozco’s entry into the United States was
340
unlawful. The court then concluded that it would be an “absurd
result” to find Orozco’s entry, while criminal, is lawful for purposes
341
of section 245(a).
The court further said that Orozco was
338. See In re Areguillin, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 310 n.5 (stating “[i]n 1952, Congress
provided for adjustment of status, under prescribed conditions, to ‘an alien who
was lawfully admitted to the United States as a bona fide nonimmigrant . . . .’
Section 245 was subsequently amended in 1958 and in 1960 to eliminate that
restrictive terminology.
The immigration judge’s interpretation [that the
respondent did not establish an inspection and admission for purposes of section
245] would in effect reenact the superseded law.”). See also supra Part II.B.1.
339. See INA §§ 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), 237(a)(1)(H), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(H). See also KURZBAN, supra note 30, at 64 (discussing section 212(i)
and saying that “[o]ne of the central purposes of the waiver is to provide for the
unification of families”); Casem v. I.N.S., 8 F.3d 700, 703 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating
that “Congress enacted the waiver provision of section 1251(f) [former § 241(f)],
the predecessor to section 1251(a)(1)(H) [former § 241(a)(1)(H), predecessor to
section 237(a)(1)(H)], to prevent the break-up of families comprised in part of
American citizens or lawful permanent residents”).
340. Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1072 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a), 1028(a)(7)).
341. Id. (stating “we reject Orozco’s argument that his entry, while criminal,
was lawful for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) because he presented himself for
inspection and admission and was allowed to enter the United States. To hold
otherwise would create an ‘absurd result’, which we must avoid, if possible, when
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essentially asking it to “turn a blind eye to criminal and fraudulent
342
acts underlying his entry . . . .” The court certainly has a right to
be concerned about criminal and fraudulent acts. However,
Congress has already provided ample means by which to address
this behavior in the form of discretionary bars, strict waiver
standards, and inadmissibility and removal provisions. These
provisions do not permit non-citizens like Orozco who engage in
fraud to be simply let off the hook, as the court seems to intimate.
First, if Orozco is found to have been “inspected and
admitted” under section 245(a), he still has the burden of proving
343
his admissibility to the United States.
Orozco, however, is not
admissible because he engaged in fraud when he entered the
United States with a false alien registration card, thereby falling
344
within INA section 212(a)(6)(C)(i). As previously discussed, one
of the main reasons Congress enacted this section of inadmissibility
was to “prevent non-citizens from securing entry into the country
by fraudulent means and then, when the fraud is discovered,
proceeding with an immigration application as if nothing
345
happened.”
Because Orozco is inadmissible, in order to
overcome the admissibility requirement in INA section 245(a), he
must seek a waiver under the narrow standards set forth in section
212(i), which requires establishing extreme hardship to either a
346
U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse or parent.
Assuming, then, that Orozco is statutorily eligible for
adjustment of status pursuant to section 245(a) and meets the
discretionary and statutory requirements of section 212(i), his
adjustment application may still be denied as a matter of discretion
347
under sections 245(a) and 212(i).
interpreting a statute.”).
342. Id.
343. See INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (requiring that the non-citizen be
“admissible to the United States for permanent residence.”).
344. INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); Orozco, 521 F.3d at
1070.
345. AILF PRACTICE ADVISORY, supra note 77, at 4. See also 1 Foreign Affairs
Manual, Intent of Congress, 22 C.F.R. 40 § 40.60(G) (9th ed. 2008); supra Part II.D.
346. INA § 212(i) requires that the non-citizen show that the refusal of his or
her admission will result in extreme hardship to a United States citizen spouse or
parent. INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
347. INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (stating “[t]he status of an alien . . . may
be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations
as he may prescribe . . . ”); Yui Sing Tse v. I.N.S., 596 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1979)
(stating a “petition for adjustment of status raises two issues: whether petitioner is
eligible for the relief sought; and, if so, whether relief should be granted as a

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

57

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 8

2008]

OROZCO v. MUKASEY

125

Additionally, individuals who gain entry into the United States
by fraud within the meaning of section 212(a)(6)(i) are subject to
removal from the country under section 237(a)(1)(A). Indeed, the
Board recently pointed this out in In re Orellana de Barden, noting
that while the respondent could not be charged under the grounds
of inadmissibility for having entered without inspection (because
she was indeed “admitted”), there is a ground of removability for
348
someone who was inadmissible at the time of entry.
Finally, section 274(C) of the Act specifically imposes penalties
in the form of a fine on a non-citizen who uses a document
belonging to someone else for purposes of obtaining an
349
Moreover, as the Ninth
immigration benefit under the Act.
Circuit pointed out, other criminal statutes exist to potentially
punish someone for using counterfeit documents to enter the
350
United States.
matter of discretion.”); Castillo v. I.N.S., 350 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1965) (stating
amendment to INA § 245, which eliminated entry as a bona fide nonimmigrant as
a statutory requirement for adjustment of status, did not limit the scope of the
Attorney General’s discretion); In re Agyeman, 1999 B.I.A. LEXIS 52, at *10 (B.I.A.
1999) (denying adjustment of status as a matter of discretion because “the
respondent's affirmative equities are outweighed by []his adverse criminal
history”); In re Pimentel, 17 I. & N. Dec. 482, 486 (B.I.A. 1986) (affirming the
Immigration Judge’s decision to deny as a matter of discretion the adjustment of
status application of the respondent who had entered into a bigamous marriage in
order to avoid the effect of the immigration laws and facilitate his entry as a lawful
permanent resident); INA § 212(i) states that “the Attorney General may, in the
discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause . . . .” INA §
212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1). See also Zhang v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 172, 176 (2nd
Cir. 2006) (stating “[t]he plain language of § 1182(i)(1) [§ 212(i)] specifically
provides that an applicant must demonstrate extreme hardship ‘to the satisfaction
of the Attorney General’—language that, as we have held before, ‘clearly entrusts
the decision to the Attorney General's discretion.’”); Cervantes-Gonzalez v. I.N.S.,
244 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating “[l]ike the discretionary relief at issue
in Samaniego-Meraz, § 212(i) provides immigration judges with discretion to waive a
bar to admissibility”).
348. In re Orellana de Barden, No. A95-672-921, 2007 WL 4699871 (B.I.A. Nov.
13, 2007).
349. INA § 274C(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(3) (stating “[i]t is unlawful for any
person or entity knowingly to use . . . any document lawfully issued to . . . a person
other than the possessor . . . for the purpose of . . . obtaining a benefit under this
chapter . . . .”).
350. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)(1)-(3) (2006) (making it a federal crime to
knowingly and willfully make a false or fraudulent statement or make use of a false
writing or document knowing the same to contain false or fraudulent statement or
entry). See also id. § 1028(a)(7) (prohibiting an individual from using a means of
identification of another person with the intent to commit an unlawful activity that
constitutes a violation of federal law); Orozco v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th
Cir. 2008).
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Therefore, finding Orozco to have been “admitted” into the
United States does not lead to an “absurd” contradiction because
numerous measures already exist for addressing the fraudulent
nature of his entry into the United States. Going beyond these
measures and adopting such an overly-restrictive interpretation,
which overlooks years of precedent decisions by the agency and the
courts, that renders other provisions of the statute meaningless,
and forever bar individuals otherwise eligible from adjusting status,
seems inequitable, incorrect, and unnecessary.
V. OROZCO: WHAT DOES IT MEAN AND WHAT LIES AHEAD
A. Impact of the Orozco Decision on the Courts and on the Agency
Despite its Recent Vacature
Orozco v. Mukasey was a published decision, which meant that it
was binding law in the Ninth Circuit until its vacature in October
351
On May 8, 2008, Orozco and respondent Michael
2008.
Mukasey, Attorney General, filed a joint motion with the Ninth
Circuit to refer the matter to mediation and stay the issuance of the
352
court’s mandate. The basis for the motion was that ICE charged
Orozco with being removable under INA section 237 in the Notice
353
to Appear, the charging document in removal proceedings.
As
previously discussed, however, such a charge only applies if a non354
INA section 212, in
citizen has been admitted into the country.
contrast, applies to non-citizens who have not been admitted into
355
the United States. The Ninth Circuit granted the joint motion on
May 12, 2008, and referred the case to the court’s mediation

351. See Ninth Circuit, Cir. Rule 36-1 (stating “[a]s used in this rule, the term
PUBLICATION means to make a disposition available to legal publishing
companies to be reported and cited”) and Cir. Rule 36-3 (stating that
“[u]npublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not precedent, except
when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or
issue preclusion.”), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/Documents.nsf/
c9254affb51940d288257316006b454d/$FILE/FRAP_0707.pdf. See infra Part V for
information about the authority of the decision on Immigration Judges and the
BIA.
352. Orozco v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2008), appeal docketed, No. 0670521 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Orozco Appeal]. See also AILF PRACTICE
ADVISORY, supra note 77.
353. Co-author’s conversation with counsel for Brian Orozco.
354. See supra Part II.C.1.
355. See generally INA §§ 212 and 237.
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356

program.
In the meantime, Orozco also filed a petition for
357
rehearing with the Ninth Circuit on May 9, 2008.
Additionally, the parties filed a joint motion to reopen
358
proceedings with the BIA. The BIA granted the parties’ motion,
reopened the case, and remanded it back to the Immigration Judge
359
for further proceedings. Counsel for Orozco then filed a Motion
to Reconsider the Remand to the Immigration Judge and
360
Following the
requested additional briefing at the Board.
Board’s decision granting the motion to reopen, the parties filed a
joint Motion to Vacate Published Decision and Voluntary Dismissal
of Petition For Review on October 7, 2008, with the Ninth
361
362
Circuit.
The decision was vacated on October 20, 2008.
Additionally, the Board granted the request for additional
363
Assuming extension requests are granted, the brief for
briefing.
364
the petitioner Orozco is due at the Board on December 8, 2008.
Although the decision has been vacated, there is concern
within the immigrant advocate community that the Ninth Circuit
has now provided the tools for other circuit courts and the BIA to
issue similar published opinions that will affect immigrants
throughout the country. Likewise, advocates are also concerned
that the CIS and immigration judges nationwide will apply the
reasoning in Orozco as a means to limit the scope of non-citizens
who can adjust their status in the United States. Moreover, the case
365
of Orozco is not over.
Counsel for Orozco and a team of
immigration attorneys around the country are preparing to brief
366
the case before the BIA once again and urge a different outcome.
356. See Orozco Appeal, supra note 350.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Author’s conversation with counsel for Orozco; e-mail on file with
authors.
361. See Orozco Appeal, supra note 350. Pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the circuit clerk may dismiss a docketed appeal if
the parties file a signed dismissal agreement specifying how costs are to be paid
and pay any fees that are due. FED. R. APP. P. 42(b) (2008). No mandate or other
process, however, may issue without a court order. Id. An appeal may be
dismissed on the appellant's motion on terms agreed to by the parties or fixed by
the court. Id.
362. See Orozco Appeal, supra note 350.
363. Author’s conversation with counsel for Orozco.
364. Id.
365. Author’s conversation with counsel for Orozco.
366. Author is working with the American Immigration Law Foundation on a
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If the outcome does not change and if other circuits follow the lead
of the Ninth Circuit in Orozco, however, any individual who entered
the United States without valid documentation who seeks to apply
for adjustment of status in any of the states that fall within that
particular circuit would be denied such opportunity.
Moreover, once the BIA has the opportunity to hear the issues
in Orozco for a second time, it could choose to publish the decision
using the detailed reasoning that has been gift wrapped for the
Board in the Ninth Circuit’s now vacated decision, thereby making
the decision binding on cases throughout the country (except for
those that arise out of circuits where the appellate court has
367
rendered decisions contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s).
Similarly,
should Orozco’s case get resolved without the BIA needing to
reach the issues addressed by the Ninth Circuit, the BIA could just
as easily issue a similar precedent decision on the issue having the
same, if not greater, effect on non-citizens seeking to gain legal
status in the United States.
B. Anticipated Impact on Immigrants and Their Families
Although it is difficult to gauge the full effect of Orozco up until
this point, the impact of the decision on immigrants and their
families is likely to be immense. Previously, individuals who
entered without proper documentation were allowed the
368
opportunity to apply for adjustment of status. Now, they could be
statutorily barred from adjusting their status and are being
cautioned by practitioners, including the author, against applying
369
for the benefit altogether.
potential practice advisory and possible amicus brief for Orozco.
367. BIA PRACTICE MANUAL, § 1.4(d)(i) (rev. July 30, 2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/apptmtn4.htm
(stating
that
“[p]ublished decisions also constitute precedent that binds the Board, the
Immigration Courts, and DHS”); Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1013
(9th Cir. 2006) (noting that only “selected decisions of the Board rendered by a
three-member panel or by the Board en banc may be designated to serve as
precedents") (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2006)).
368. See, e.g., In re Areguillin, 17 I. & N. Dec. 308 (B.I.A. 1980); In re Orellana
de Barden, No. A95-672-921, 2007 WL 4699871 (B.I.A. Nov. 13, 2007).
369. Though Orozco is no longer the law of the Ninth Circuit, immigration
practitioners are reluctant to affirmatively apply for adjustment of status for
individuals in a similar situation to Orozco. Eds. For example, it is the practice of
this co-author at this time to advise her clients to not apply for adjustment of status
if they have an entry similar to that of Orozco’s because she believes that the
alternative would be putting her clients at risk of being denied residency and
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Because of this major change in analysis, many non-citizens
will potentially face a situation similar to that in 1952 by having to
370
undertake a trip abroad to secure their immigrant visas.
The
consequences of departing the United States, however, are much
greater today than they were in 1952. Of those individuals who
may need to travel abroad, countless will now require unlawful
presence waivers under INA section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) for having
been in the United States without legal status for a period of over
371
180 days. For those who require such a waiver, the disadvantages
are much more than the cost of traveling abroad. First, not all non372
In order to
citizens are eligible for an unlawful presence waiver.
be eligible for a waiver, one must have the necessary qualifying
relative relationship, including a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent
373
Similar to the waiver under INA
resident parent or spouse.
section 212(i), U.S. citizens and lawful permanent resident
374
children of the non-citizen do not count as qualifying relatives.
placed in removal proceedings.
370. See 22 C.F.R. Part 42 (regarding immigrant visa processing from abroad).
See also former INA § 245(i), which was repealed by legislation (allowing noncitizens who were not inspected to nevertheless adjust their status under section
245(a), but only if they are beneficiaries of a visa petition or labor certification
filed on or before April 30, 2001, and can prove their physical presence in the
United States on a particular date); INA § 245(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (2006)
(permitting, generally speaking, adjustment of status under INA section 245(a) for
certain individuals who accept unauthorized employment, who are in unlawful
immigration status, or who fail to continuously maintain lawful status since entry
into the United States, but not allowing the same for individual who were not
“inspected and admitted” within the meaning of section 245(a). See also Tamara
K. Fogg, supra note 65, at 39, 40 (stating “[a]lthough [section 245] eliminated preexamination with passage of the 1952 Act, Congress did not replace the procedure
with a satisfactory substitute . . . . Therefore, under the 1952 Act, most aliens then
residing in the United States who would be qualified for permanent residency had
no real option but to travel to their homeland . . . .”).
371. INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(I)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(I)(i); INA
§ 212(a)(9)(B)(v). See supra note 60 for more discussion about unlawful presence
penalties and waivers.
372. INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(v) sets forth the requirements for the waiver:
The Attorney General has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of
an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States
citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is
established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of
admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to
the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. No court
shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action by the Attorney
General regarding a waiver under this clause.
373. INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).
374. Id.
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Furthermore, the mere existence of qualifying relatives is
insufficient to meet the requirements of the unlawful presence
waiver. The non-citizen must prove that the relative would suffer
“extreme hardship” if the non-citizen were unable to return to the
375
The Board has interpreted the “extreme
United States.
hardship” requirement and has found that such hardship must go
beyond that which a family member would normally suffer if he or
376
she were removed from the United States. Specifically, the Board
has determined that the “extreme hardship” inquiry with respect to
a waiver of inadmissibility is essentially the same as that to be made
when reviewing an application for suspension of deportation under
377
former INA section 244.
The Board has set forth various factors
to be considered in making an extreme hardship determination.
These factors are:
[T]he presence of lawful permanent resident or United
States citizen family ties to this country; the qualifying
relative’s family ties outside the United States; the
conditions in the country or countries to which the
qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the
qualifying relative’s ties to such countries; the financial
impact of departure from this country; and, finally,
significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to
an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to
378
which the qualifying relative would relocate.
Thus, one can see that not all applicants will be able to meet
the high extreme hardship standard. If a non-citizen is denied the
375. Id.
376. See United States v. Becerril-Lopez, 541 F.3d 881, 886 (9th Cir. 2008)
(stating that “[t]o demonstrate the "extreme hardship" required by the statute, the
defendant must show that the consequences of his being removed would go
beyond the common results of deportation, such as a loss of financial support for
relatives in the United States”) (internal quotations omitted) (citing United States
v. Arce-Hernandez, 163 F.3d 559, 563 (9th Cir. 1998)). See also Shooshtary v.
I.N.S., 39 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating “[a]s we have stated before, the
common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme
hardship”) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Hassan v. I.N.S., 927 F.2d 465,
468 (9th Cir. 1991)).
377. See In re Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 560, 565 (B.I.A. 1991) (“[W]e
find the factors articulated in cases involving suspension of deportation and other
waivers of inadmissibility to be helpful, given that both forms of relief require
extreme hardship and the exercise of discretion.”). See also In re Kao and Lin, 23 I.
& N. Dec, 45, 49 n.3 (B.I.A. 2001) (“The standard for ‘extreme hardship’ that we
apply in the present [suspension of deportation] case is the same as that applied
in cases . . . involving waivers of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act.”).
378. In re Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 565–66.
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waiver, then he or she must wait outside the United States for a
period of three or ten years, depending on the length of unlawful
379
presence. Thus, all individuals affected by Orozco who attempt to
obtain lawful permanent residency risk being stuck outside of the
country for many years and separated from family and friends in
the United States in the interim.
Similarly, but even more significantly, if the courts and the
government interpret “admission” as the Ninth Circuit did in
Orozco, a great deal of individuals will now be subject to the
“permanent bar” under section 212(a)(9)(C) and ineligible for any
380
Under that section, any non-citizen who was previously
waivers.
deported or removed from the United States or who accrued over
one year of unlawful presence and who then “enters or attempts to
381
enter the United States without being admitted” is inadmissible.
Thus, once again, the term “admission” becomes critical to the
equation. Individuals in the above situation who were “admitted”
are not subject to the permanent bar; individuals not “admitted”
382
are permanently inadmissible.
Prior to the Orozco decision, many non-citizens who had
previously received orders of removal or had accrued over one year
of unlawful presence, departed the country, and subsequently
reentered without proper documentation were nevertheless
eligible to apply for adjustment of status in conjunction with the
383
appropriate waivers.
This is because their subsequent reentry
379. INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(I)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(I)(i) (stating that a
non-citizen who has accumulated over 180 days of unlawful presence is
inadmissible to the United States for a period of three years). INA
§ 212(a)(9)(B)(I)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(I)(ii) (stating that a non-citizen
who has accumulated one year or more of unlawful presence is inadmissible for a
period of ten years).
380. INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(i) provides “[a]ny alien who (I) has been unlawfully
present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or (II)
has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240, or any other
provision of law, and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without
being admitted is inadmissible.” INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(i). Inadmissibility under
this section is commonly referred to as the “permanent bar” within the
immigration community. Id.
381. INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i).
382. INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(iii) contains a limited exception to the permanent
bar. Under this section, an individual subject to the permanent bar may seek
advance permission to reapply for admission once he or she has remained outside
of the United States for a period of ten years. INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (a)(9)(C)(iii).
383. Individuals who previously received orders of removal were eligible to
apply for adjustment of status in conjunction with waiver under INA
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into the United States was still considered an “admission.” Now,
under the Orozco analysis, such individuals would be subject to the
384
permanent bar because their subsequent entry without proper
385
documentation is not considered an “admission.”
Thus, if the BIA and other circuit courts follow the Orozco
analysis, it is quite likely that the expected increase in the need for
waivers and rise in individuals subject to the permanent bar will
have significant and devastating effects on immigrants and their
families as they cope with the resulting temporary and permanent
separations from one another.
VI. CONCLUSION
Someone like Brian Orozco who gained entry into the United
States by presenting a false document to an immigration officer is
subject to serious immigration and criminal consequences under
the Act and other federal statutes. But it is contrary to BIA
precedent, the canons of statutory construction, and is wholly
inequitable to determine, as the court in Orozco originally did, that
one of those consequences is a permanent statutory bar to

§ 212(a)(9)(A)(iii); this provision allows an individual to seek permission to
reapply for admission after having been ordered deported or removed. INA
§ 212(a)(9)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii). Similarly, individuals who had
accrued an aggregate period of more than year of unlawful presence in the United
States, left the country, and later entered the United States without proper
documentation could apply for adjustment of status with an unlawful presence
waiver under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(v). INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(v).
384. Additionally, individuals who were previously ordered removed may also
be subject to reinstatement of the old removal order under section 241(a)(5),
which states:
[if] the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United
States illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily,
under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from
its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the
alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this Act, and
the alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the
reentry.
INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).
385. See Orozco, 521 F. 3d at 1071–72 (stating “[t]he term ‘admitted’ is . . .
defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) [INA § 101(a)(13)(A)]. According to the
statutory definition . . . ‘admission’ mean[s], with respect to an alien, the lawful
entry of the alien into the United States . . . . The definitions found in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A) [INA § 101(a)(13)(A)] apply to terms ‘used in [the] chapter . . .
We further conclude that lawful entry requires more than simply presenting
oneself for inspection and being allowed to enter the United States.’”).
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adjusting status under section 245(a). Contrary to the court’s
finding, the precedent and the overall statutory language support a
finding that someone in Orozco’s situation has been “admitted” to
the United States for purposes of section 245(a) and should have
the opportunity to seek adjustment of status along with the
necessary waiver(s) of inadmissibility.
In its original Orozco decision, however, the Ninth Circuit
reached a different conclusion. According to the Ninth Circuit,
the language of the relevant statutory provisions requires a lawful
entry into the United States, which means something more than
just presenting oneself for inspection and being allowed to proceed
into the country. Yet, as previously discussed, the definition of the
term “admission” does not unambiguously lead to the court’s
conclusion. Rather, courts have previously interpreted the term
“admission” to mean something other than the “lawful entry”
definition now set forth in the Act. Given the imprecise nature of
the meaning of the term, and the occasional disparate treatment of
its meaning, the Ninth Circuit should have given weight to
Areguillin, the BIA precedent decision that addresses the term
specifically within the context of the provision at issue in Orozco:
section 245(a). Yet, the court determined that Areguillin was of no
persuasive value in light of IIRIRA. As discussed, however, the BIA
has never overruled Areguillin in a published decision and
numerous sources continue to cite the decision as the standard for
determining whether a non-citizen has been “admitted” within the
meaning of 245(a). If the court understood Areguillin to be
overruled by the change in the statute, it should have at least given
the agency the first opportunity to fully address the issue in light of
IIRIRA and provide a more thorough explanation before deciding
the matter itself.
Additionally, absurd results follow from, and are not avoided
by, the Ninth Circuit’s overly-narrow interpretation of “admission”
because it produces inconsistent results within section
237(a)(1)(A) and renders section 237(a)(1)(H) meaningless.
Numerous measures already exist in the statute to address the
court’s concern about absurd results if it followed Orozco’s
argument. Orozco is in fact penalized by provisions such as
sections 212(a)(6)(C)(i) and 237(a)(1)(A), the narrow standards
of the corresponding waiver provisions, and criminal fraud statutes
for his fraudulent manner of entry. Congress did not turn a “blind
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eye” to fraudulent or criminal behavior when it enacted these
provisions. In subjecting himself to such provisions, by applying for
an immigration benefit under section 245(a), Orozco is not asking
the court to do so either.
Although the vacature of the published decision has, for now,
been beneficial to Brian Orozco and all of those individuals in his
situation sitting in the Ninth Circuit, immigration practitioners
throughout the country are prepared for its analysis to live on and
be applied by the CIS, immigration courts, BIA, and circuit courts.
Thus, despite the vacature of the decision, the Orozco issue is likely
to surface again in the future. Accordingly, the Board, when reconsidering Orozco’s case, should issue a published decision
clarifying once and for all the meaning of “admitted” in the context
of INA section 245(a) in light of the statutory definition added by
IIRIRA. Such a definition should remain consistent with the longstanding definition set forth by the Board’s decision in In re
Areguillin. In a new decision, the Board should follow its precedent
and find that an individual who was inspected at a port-of-entry and
allowed to enter the United States has been “admitted” for
purposes of INA sections 101(a)(13) and 245(a).

386. See Orozco, 521 F.3d at 1072 (stating that “[i]n essence, Orozco asks us to
turn a blind eye to criminal and fraudulent acts underlying his entry . . . ”).
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